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BACK TO THE FUTURE: THE IN Loco PARENTIS DOCTRINE
AND ITS IMPACT ON WHETHER K-12 SCHOOLS AND
TEACHERS OWE A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO STUDENTS

JOHN E. RUMEL*

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between primary and secondary ("K-12") schools, school
administrators and teachers ("school personnel") and students-and the legal
obligations arising from that relationship-have never been more complex or
important. In recent years, society has increasingly viewed, and courts have
increasingly referred to, teachers as role models for students.' In spite of, and
sometimes because of, online educational options and e-mail, as well as
extracurricular activities, students spend increasing amounts of time interacting
with teachers both at school and away from campus.2 Studies have shown that
the single most important factor in a K-12 student's academic development is the
teacher in the classroom.' And, the media invariably covers those relatively
infrequent, but high profile, cases involving inappropriate personal relationships

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. J.D., 1981, Hastings
College of Law, San Francisco; B.A., 1977, University of California, Santa Cruz. The author
would like to thank his colleagues on the University ofIdaho College of Law faculty for organizing
a faculty scholars colloquium which allowed him to present an early version of this Article. The
author would also like to thank the College of Law for supporting his work on this Article with a
summer research stipend. In addition, the author benefitted greatly from input received from his
colleague Professor Mark Anderson as to the Article generally and, in particular, in its discussion
of fiduciary relationships, from Professor Lynn Daggett at Gonzaga University School of Law, a
fellow traveler in the Education law field, and from James Christiansen, Ed.D., a retired school
administrator (and internationally-recognized woodturner) on issues of education policy. Their
contributions were and are very much appreciated.
1. See Rebecca DeLuccia-Reinstein, What is the Role of Teachers in Education?, EHOW,
http://www.ehow.com/about_6509642_role-teachers-education_.html (last visited July 2, 2013);
see also Wright v. Kan. State Bd. of Educ., 268 P.3d 1231, 1238 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (citing
Hainline v. Bond, 824 P.2d 959 (Kan. 1992)); Thompson v. Dep't ofPub. Instruction, 541 N.W.2d
182, 189 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) ("[A] teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a
subtle but important influence over their perceptions and values." (quoting Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979))).
2. See, e.g., MICHAEL YOAKAM wITH NANCY FRANKLIN & RON WARREN, DISTANCE
LEARNING: A GUIDE TO SYSTEM PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION 8-9 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing
email interaction); I. Karasavvidis et al., Exploring the Mechanisms through which Computers
Contributeto Learning, 19 J. COMPUTER ASSISTED LEARNING 115, 115-28 (2003) (discussing in
class and online instruction); Bridget K. Hamre & Robert C. Pianta, Student-Teacher
Relationships, in CHILDREN'S NEEDS III: DEVELOPMENT, PREVENTION, AND INTERVENTION 59-72
(George G. Bear & Kathleen M. Minke eds., 2006) (discussing extracurricular activities).
3. JOHN A. C. HATTIE, VISIBLE LEARNING: A SYNTHESIS OF OVER 800 META-ANALYSES
RELATING TO ACHIEVEMENT 2,

22-26 (2009).
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between teachers and students.4
In the past twenty-five years, a number of courts, although divided on the
issue, and even more commentators have opined that K-12 schools and school
personnel owe a fiduciary obligation to the students with whom they interact.
This Article addresses that issue. It proposes and concludes that, based on a
proper understanding of both the law underlying the in loco parentis doctrine and
the law relating to the creation and regulation of fiduciary relationships, K-12
schools and teachers generally should not be held to owe or violate a fiduciary
duty to students when they engage in conduct undertaken as a legitimate part of
the purpose for which they are employed, i.e., the education of the student or the
group of students of which the student is a member. In contrast, school personnel
should only be held to owe or violate a fiduciary duty when they either engage
in conduct-such as sexual harassment or abuse-that is wholly outside of, but
made possible by, their educational relationship, or when they take on a
traditional fiduciary role, such as holding money in trust or otherwise
administering funds for students.
Part I of the Article addresses the in loco parentis doctrine.5 Specifically, it
discusses the historic and current use of the in loco parentis doctrine in expanding
the rights of K-12 schools and school personnel vis-A-vis students and limiting
the individual rights of students. It further discusses the limitations contained
within the doctrine concerning its application to activities and conduct outside the
educational purpose. It also discusses the doctrine's effect on the breadth and/or
nature of tort and constitutional liability owed by schools and school personnel
to individual students. Part II of this Article discusses the case law and
commentary that surrounds the creation and regulation of fiduciary duties, paying
special attention to the judiciary's proclivity to use analogistic and moralistic
reasoning to expand the universe of fiduciary relationships.6 It also focuses on
well-settled legal principles relating to the lack, generally speaking, of any
fiduciary obligation owed by parents to their children and the duty of undivided
loyalty that a fiduciary owes to the person to whom his or her fiduciary duty runs.
Part III of the Article chronicles the split in the decisional law concerning whether
K-12 schools, administrators and teachers owe a fiduciary duty to students.
Specifically, it divides the cases in each category between those relying upon the
in loco parentis doctrine and those cases that do not. It also discusses the nearunanimity amongst scholars and commentators that K-12 schools and school
personnel have a fiduciary obligation to their student charges. Part IV of the
Article discusses the reasons for the current state of the case law and
commentary/scholarship. 8 In so doing, it further discusses the jurisprudential
tendency to expand the categories of fiduciary relationships based on analogistic

4. See, e.g., A Lingering Shame: Sexual Abuse of Students by School Employees, EDUC.
WK., http://www.edweek.org/ew/collections/apsexabuse/index.html (last visited July 2, 2013).
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
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and moralistic thinking, while simultaneously ignoring or misunderstanding the
impact of the in loco parentis doctrine on the analysis of this important legal
issue. Part V of the Article proposes and discusses in detail the above-mentioned
standard emanating from a proper understanding of the in loco parentis doctrine
and the law underlying the creation and regulation of fiduciary relationships.9 As
alluded to above, it concludes that school personnel do not have a fiduciary
relationship with students when they are engaged in activities that further the
legitimate purpose of education and only have such a relationship when they
engage in ultra vires conduct and activities-in other words, engage in conduct
and activities made possible by, but falling outside of, the purpose for which they
were hired--or take on a traditional fiduciary role beyond the role of furthering
their legitimate educational purpose.
I. THE IN Loco PARENTIS DOCTRINE
A. The School- and School Personnel-EmpoweringAspect of In Loco Parentis
In loco parentis literally means "in the place of a parent."'" The doctrine,
according to its generally accepted common law meaning, refers to a
person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by
assuming the obligations incident to the parental relation without going
through the formalities necessary to legal adoption. It embodies the two
ideas of assuming the parental status and discharging the parental
duties. '

Although applied to a variety of custodial relationships, 2 the in loco parentis
doctrine has had its most significant application to the teacher-student or school
administrator-student relationship in the K-12 educational setting. 13 Thus,

9. See infra Part V.
10. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed. 2004).

11. Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1947), quoted in Megonnell
v. Infotech Solutions, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-02339, 2009 WL 3857451, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 18,2009);
see also BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10 (defining in loco parentis as the person or entity
charged with "taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent").
12. See 67A C.J.S. Parentand Child § 347 (2013).
13. See generally John C. Hogan & Mortimer D. Schwartz, In Loco Parentisin the United
States 1765-1985, 8 J. LEGAL HIST. 260 (1987). As more fully discussed infra at note 140 and
accompanying text, the in loco parentis doctrine currently has little to no application at the college
and university level. See Jack L. Stewart, Comment, University Liabilityfor Student AlcoholRelated Injuries:A ReconsiderationandAssessment under Oregon Law, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV.

829, 835-36 (1991) (discussing the demise of the in loco parentis doctrine in the higher education
context); see also McCauley v. Univ. of the Virgin Is., 618 F.3d 232,243 (3d Cir. 2010) ("' [P]ublic
elementary and high school administrators,' unlike their counterparts at public universities, 'have
the unique responsibility to act in locoparentis."'(quoting DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301,
314 (3d Cir. 2008))).
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Blackstone, in discussing the meaning of the doctrine at common law stated that
[the father] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his
life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis,
and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his
may be necessary to
charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as
14
employed.
is
he
which
for
purposes
answer the
In this context, modem commentators reviewing judicial decisions have
found that courts have viewed the doctrine primarily as a grant of power to
schools and teachers and as a limitation on the rights of students to protection
from harm occurring in the school setting or caused by school personnel.' 5
Indeed, in one of the first cases in the United States discussing the doctrine in the
primary school setting, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated as follows:
One of the most sacred duties of parents, is to train up and qualify their
children, for becoming useful and virtuous members of society; this duty
cannot be effectually performed without the ability to command
obedience, to control stubbornness, to quicken diligence, and to reform
bad habits .... The teacher is the substitute of the parent;.. . and in the
exercise of these delegated duties, is invested with his power. 6
Similarly, this grant of power to teachers and schools carried with it a
concomitant restraint on the judiciary's ability to interfere with "[t]he right of the
school-master to require obedience to reasonable rules and a proper submission
to his authority, and to inflict corporal punishment for disobedience."' 7 Or, as
stated by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in discussing the discretion vested
in school authorities under the in loco parentis doctrine,

14. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 441 (1765); see
also Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 13, at 260.
15. See, e.g., Susan Stuart, In Loco Parentisin the Public Schools: Abused, Confused and in
Need of Change, 78 U. CIN. L. REv. 969, 970 (2010) (arguing the "unsuitability" of the use of the
in loco parentis doctrine in public schools and stating "[flrom its origins in U.S. public education
law, the common law doctrine of in loco parentis was applied almost exclusively to student
discipline. Rarely was it understood to also apply to parental-like responsibilities for the care of
students."); Tyler Stoehr, Comment, Letting the Legislature Decide: Why the Court's Use of In
Loco ParentisOught to be Praised,Not Condemned, 2011 BYU L. REv. 1695, 1730 (disagreeing
with Stuart regarding the suitability of the in loco parentis doctrine in public schools, but stating
that "[i]n the case of in loco parentis, there appear to be good reasons why American courts
accepted only the disciplinary side of the doctrine as traditionally understood, while rejecting the
custodial side"); see also Perry A. Zirkel & Henry F. Reichner, Is the In Loco Parentis Doctrine
Dead?, 15 J.L. & EDUC. 271, 281 (1986) (Although "the courts have accepted with relative ease
the notion that in loco parentis gives rise to duties as well as rights of educators . . . , they have
implemented this notion with notable difficulty.., leaving negligence liability to remain or fall on
other grounds.").
16. State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 365, 365-66 (1837).
17. Sheehan v. Sturges, 2 A. 841, 842 (Conn. 1885).
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To accomplish th[e] desirable ends [of teaching self-restraint,
obedience, and other civic virtues], the master of a school is necessarily
invested with much discretionary power. . . . He must govern these
pupils, quicken the slothful, spur the indolent, restrain the impetuous, and
control the stubborn. He must make rules, give commands, and punish
disobedience. What rules, what commands, and what punishments shall
be imposed are necessarily largely within the
18 discretion of the master,
where none are defined by the school board.
This power invested in schools, administrators, and teachers to control
students, although limited by constitutional and tort principles, 9 has continued
to the present day. Thus, as recently as 2012, a Connecticut trial court, quoting
the above-cited, late-Nineteenth century decision of the Connecticut Supreme
Court, stated that "[a] teacher stands in loco parentis toward a pupil. He must
maintain discipline, and if a pupil disobeys his orders it is his duty to use
reasonable means to compel compliance. 20
B. InternalDoctrinalLimitations of In Loco Parentis
As quoted above, Blackstone's classic formulation of the school- and school
personnel-empowering aspect of the in loco parentis doctrine contains within it
a limitation on its use in the primary and secondary school settings. Thus, one
commentator, discussing the Restatement (Second) of Torts' codification of that
aspect of Blackstone's formulation making applicability of the doctrine turn on
whether the power exercised by school personnel is "necessary to answer the
purposes for which he is employed," has stated that "the in locoparentisauthority
of a school over a student is limited to the purpose of the school's existence: the
student's education or the education of the group of which the student is a
member."'" Courts, adhering to this same doctrinal limitation, have refused to

18. Patterson v. Nutter, 7 A. 273, 274 (Me. 1886). Thus, Justice Thomas, the sole current
member of the United States Supreme Court espousing the view that the in loco parentis doctrine
continues to grant schools and their administrators and teachers virtually unfettered discretion in
regulating the constitutional rights of students, has tersely stated in reviewing early cases that "[t]he
doctrine of in loco parentis limited the ability of schools to set rules and control their classrooms
in almost no way." Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 416 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
19. Hurlburt v. Noxon, 565 N.Y.S.2d 683,684 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (tort limitations); Smith v. W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ., 295 S.E.2d 680, 685 (W. Va. 1982) (constitutional limitations).
20. Straiton v. New Milford Bd. of Educ., No. DBDCV106003255S, 2012 WL 1218160, at
*6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2012) (citing Sheehan, 2 A. at 841).
21. Stephen R. Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School BoardAuthority to Regulate
Student ConductandStatus:A NonconstitutionalAnalysis,117 U. PA. L. REv. 373,379,382 (1969)
(quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453). See id. at 381 ("One who is charged
only with the education or some other part of the training of a child has the privilege of using force
or confinement to discipline the child only in so far as the privilege is necessary for the education
or other part of the training which is committed or delegated to the actor." (quoting RESTATEMENT

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:71 1

absolve school personnel from liability in a number of cases. Those cases have
included personal injury and/or civil rights cases involving non-emergency
medical treatment 2 and excessive or abusive corporal punishment." These cases
also include instances where school administrators went well beyond legitimate
educational purposes-and, hence, their delegated in loco parentis power-in
operating a cafeteria and school supply store and requiring students to boycott a
competitor.24
C. Student-ProtectiveAspect ofIn Loco Parentis
As previously alluded to, the other-albeit less forceful-principle embodied
in the in loco parentis doctrine entails K-12 schools and school personnel
discharging the parental duty of supervising or protecting students. 25 Thus, courts
have recognized that schools, administrators and teachers, based on their in loco
parentis status, must supervise and/or protect students from foreseeable harm to
both their physical and emotional well-being. 26 The duty to protect students,
however, has traditionally been cabined by, at most, negligence principles.
Rather than impose upon school supervisory personnel a heightened duty of care
concerning their responsibility toward students, courts have made clear that the
duty stemming from the in loco parentis doctrine to supervise and/or protect
requires schools, administrators, and teachers to act reasonably under the
circumstances.27 In this regard, several courts, paying homage to the genesis of
the in loco parentis doctrine, have defined that duty as how a reasonable parent
of the student would have acted under the circumstances giving rise to the alleged

(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 152 (1965))); id. at 382-83 ("One who is in charge of the training or
education of a group of children is privileged to apply such force or impose such confinement upon
one or more of them as is reasonably necessary to secure observance of the discipline necessary for
the education and training ofthe children as a group." (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 154 (1965))); see also Paul O. Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, 12 VAND. L. REv. 723,727 &
n.24 (1958-59) (discussing teacher authority as limited to circumstances under a teacher's control
and related to the purposes of education).
22. Guerrieri v. Tyson, 24 A.2d 468, 469 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942).
23. Smith, 295 S.E.2d at 685-87.
24. Hailey v. Brooks, 191 S.W. 781, 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
25. See supra note 15 and commentary discussed therein.
26. Castaldo v. Stone, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1144 (D. Colo. 2001); Doe Parents No. 1 v.
Dep't of Educ., 58 P.3d 545, 585 (Haw. 2002). For a discussion concerning whether courts have
recognized that schools and school personnel have only a duty to supervise, rather than to protect,
students under the in loco parentis doctrine, see Stuart supra note 15, at 992 n. 106.
27. Thompson v. Rochester Cmty. Sch., No. 269738,2006 WL 3040137, at *10 n.5 (Mich.
Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2006) (citing Gaincott v. Davis, 275 N.W. 229 (Mich. 1937)); Brooks v. Logan,
903 P.2d 73, 79 (Idaho 1995), supersededby statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-512B (1996), as
recognized in Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. #25, 239 P.3d 784 (Idaho 2010); Eisel v. Bd. of
Educ., 597 A.2d 447, 451-52 (Md. 1991); Phyllis v. Super. Ct., 228 Cal. Rptr. 776, 778 (Ct. App.
1986); Downs v. Conway Sch. Dist., 328 F. Supp. 338, 348 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
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harm to the student. 2' A minority of courts, based on the in loco parentis
doctrine, have required even less from schools and teachers: those courts have
held that schools and teachers are only liable when the school personnel's willful
and wanton conduct causes the student's injury.29
Whether the duty of care requires avoiding negligence or avoiding willful and
wanton conduct, courts have made clear that the situs of the child's injury may
be important. Thus, courts have held that schools and school personnel must
satisfy the applicable, in loco parentis-derived, standard of care when injury to a
student occurs on school grounds" or during supervised educational activities,
such as field trips, which occur off school grounds.3 Conversely, courts have
held that schools do not have an in loco parentis-derived duty where the harm to
a student occurs off school grounds and involves teacher conduct, such as sexual
liaisons with a student, outside of the teacher's job responsibilities.32
Consistent with the secondary nature of the duty owed to students under the
in loco parentis doctrine, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that the
duty of schools and teachers to protect students is not of constitutional
magnitude. 33 The Court, however, has relied on the student-protective aspect of
the in loco parentis doctrine in reaching its decisions in student search and seizure
and student speech cases.34 Significantly, in each of those decisions, the Court
used the student-protective aspect of the doctrine to justify limitations on the

28. W. Shield Investigations & Sec. Consultants v. Super. Ct., 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 612, 626
(App. 2000); Garcia v. City of N.Y., 646 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510-11 (App. Div. 1996).
29. Martin v. Plude, No. CV91 028393S, 1994 WL 116337, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 17,
1994); Kobylanski v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 347 N.E.2d 705, 709 (Ill. 1976); Doe v. Lawrence Hall
Youth Servs., 966 N.E.2d 52, 62 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
30. Castaldo, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 1144.
31. Stiff v. E. I11.Area of Special Educ., 621 N.E.2d 218, 222 (I11.App. Ct. 1993).
32. See, e.g., Hallberg v. State, 649 So. 2d 1355, 1358 (Fla. 1994).
33. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) ("[W]e do not, of course,
suggest that public schools as a general matter have such a degree of control over children as to
give rise to a constitutional duty to protect .... " (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)).
34. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 831 (2002) ("Securing order in the school environment sometimes requires that students
be subjected to greater controls than those appropriate for adults."); VernoniaSch. Dist., 515 U.S.
at 662 ("In the present case, moreover, the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that
this evil is being visited not just upon individuals at large, but upon children for whom it has
undertaken a special responsibility of care and direction."); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 685 (1986) ("The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent's would undermine the
school's basic educational mission."). For a discussion ofthe Tenth Circuit's decision in Earls,and
the Supreme Court's decisions in Vernonia and Fraser,see Todd A. Demitchell, The Duty to
Protect: Blackstone's Doctrine of In Loco Parentis:A Lens for Viewing the Sexual Abuse of
Students, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 17, 23-24 & n.3 1.
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constitutional rights of individual students.35 Thus, in Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton3 6 and Board of Education v. Earls,37 the Court upheld random drug
and alcohol testing of student-athletes and student participants in extracurricular
school activities, respectively, as against Fourth Amendment challenges.38
39
Additionally, in Bethel School DistrictNo. 403 v. Fraser,
the Court upheld the
suspension of a student for engaging in vulgar, sexually-suggestive speech during
a school assembly as against a First Amendment challenge.40 Notably, in the
portion of the Vernonia decision discussing the duty owed by schools to provide
a safe environment for students and to protect them from harm, the Court
supported that proposition by citing to its decisions-several of which relied on
the in loco parentis doctrine-discussing the right of school boards, school
administrators and teachers to control students or limit their rights.4 1

35. Earls, 536 U.S. at 828-38; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-66; Fraser,478 U.S. at 681-86.
For a discussion critical of both Demitchell's formulation of the duty to protect based on
Blackstone and the Supreme Court's in loco parentis jurisprudence treating the duty to protect as
a collective or third party, as opposed to an individual, right, see Smart, supranote 15, at 992 n. 106,
994.
36. 515 U.S. at 646.
37. 536 U.S. at 822.
38. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65; Earls, 536 U.S. at 825, 828.
39. 478 U.S. at 675
40. Id. at 685-86.
41. In upholding the right ofa school district to drug test student-athletes, the VernoniaCourt
stated, "[W]e have acknowledged that for many purposes 'school authorities ac[t] in locoparentis,'
with the power and indeed the duty to 'inculcate the habits and manners of civility."' Vernonia, 515
U.S. at 655 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fraser,478 U.S. at 681,684).
"Thus, while children assuredly do not 'shed their constitutional rights... at the schoolhouse gate,'
the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school." Id. at 655-56 (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969)). The Vernonia Court also referenced Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 273 (1988). Id. at 656 (holding that "public school authorities may censor schoolsponsored publications, so long as the censorship is 'reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns'); Fraser,478 U.S. at 683 ("[I]t is a highly appropriate function of public school
education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse."); Ingraham ex rel.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977) ("Imposing additional administrative safeguards
[upon corporal punishment] ... would . . . entail a significant intrusion into an area of primary
educational responsibility[.]"); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975) (holding that "due
process for a student challenging disciplinary suspension requires only that the teacher 'informally
discuss the alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred"').
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II. FIDUCIARY DUTY

A. Definition, GeneralPrinciples,and JurisprudentialTendencies
The term "fiduciary" has its origins in equity jurisprudence.4" It has been
defined as "[a] person who is required to act for the benefit of another person on
all matters within the scope of their relationship; one who owes to another the
duties of good faith, trust, confidence, and candor. 4 3 Traditionally, courts have
found a fiduciary duty to exist in relationships involving financial or economic
dealings where one party puts his or her trust in and/or relies on the expertise of
another, such as in business partnerships,' and trustee-beneficiary 45 and
investment advisor-client 46 relationships.
Indeed, it was in the
"coadventurer"/partnership context where Justice Cardozo, then Chief Judge of
New York's highest court, penned his oft-quoted words about the nature of
fiduciary relationships:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length,
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior.47
However, "a 'fiduciary or confidential relationship' is not limited to
relationships with a financial duty involved." ' Thus, one state high court has
stated that "fiduciary duty" is
[a] very broad term embracing both technical fiduciary relations and
those informal relations which exist wherever one man trusts in or relies
upon another. One founded on trust or confidence reposed by one person

42. L.S. Sealy, FiduciaryRelationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 69-70.
43. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 658.
44. See, e.g., Klotz v. Klotz, 117 S.E.2d 650, 656 (Va. 1961) ("The relationship of partners
is of a fiduciary character and imposes upon them the obligation to exercise good faith and integrity
in their dealings with one another in the partnership affairs.").
45. See, e.g., Fuller Family Holdings, L.L.C. v. N. Trust Co., 863 N.E.2d 743,754 (Il. App.
Ct. 2007) ("A trustee owes a fiduciary duty to a trust's beneficiaries and is obligated to carry out
the trust according to its terms and to act with the highest degrees of fidelity and utmost good
faith.").
46. See, e.g., People ex rel. Cuomo v. Merkin, No. 450879/09, 2010 WL 936208, at *10
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2010) ("[I]nvestment advisors ... owe fiduciary duties to their clients,
particularly where the investment advisor has broad discretion to manage the client's
investments.").
47. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546-47 (N.Y. 1928).
48. In re Estate of Karmey, No. 223270, 2002 WL 207572, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 8,
2002) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds, 658 N.W.2d 796 (Mich. 2003).
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in the integrity and fidelity of another. A "fiduciary relation" arises
whenever confidence is reposed on one side, and domination and
influence result on the other; the relation can be legal, social, domestic,
or merely personal. Such relationship exists when there is a reposing of
faith, confidence and trust, and the placing of reliance by one upon the
judgment and advice of the other.4 9
Notwithstanding the broad definition of fiduciary duty utilized by some
courts, other courts have been less willing to read the term so expansively. Those
other courts have made clear that "[t]he mere placing of a trust in another person
does not create a fiduciary relationship."5 Likewise, courts and commentators,
in refusing to place their imprimatur on relationships that litigants have
characterized as fiduciary, have stated that
"[fliduciary" is a vague term, and it has been pressed into service for a
number of ends ....
[T]he term "fiduciary" is so vague that plaintiffs
have been able to claim that fiduciary obligations have been breached
when in fact the particular defendant was not a fiduciary stricto sensu
[i.e., in the strict sense] .... "
Although disagreeing about the jurisprudential underpinnings of fiduciary
obligations," several commentators have noted that cases announcing the
existence of fiduciary obligations are "laden with moralizing language"53 such as
that employed by Cardozo in Meinhard. One commentator has further argued
that the courts' use of moralistic rhetoric has been a mechanism to control
behavior, has obscured the limits of fiduciary obligations, and has been caused

49. Kurth v. Van Horn, 380 N.W.2d 693,695-96 (Iowa 1986) (alteration in original) (quoting
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979)).
50. Zumbrun v. Univ. of S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 506 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); see also
Woods v. Pub. Logistics, Inc., No. G042821, 2011 WL 1907525, at *13 (Cal. Ct. App. May 18,
2011); Wimmer v. GreenleafArms, Inc., No. 101285/11,2011 WL 6187127, at *4-5 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Nov. 22, 2011).
51. See United States v. Milovanovic, 678 F.3d 713, 729 (9th Cir. 2012) (Clifton, J.,
concurring); Carlson v. Warren, 878 N.E.2d 844, 851 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Marmelstein v.
Kehillat New Hempstead, 841 N.Y.S.2d 493, 496 (App. Div. 2007); Doyle v. Turner, 90 F. Supp.
2d 311, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'dsub nom., Hughley v. Local 1199, Drug, Hosp. & Health Care
Emps. Union, 231 F.3d 889 (2d Cir. 2000); see also D.W.M. WATERS, THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST:
THE CASE FOR A NEW APPROACH IN ENGLISH LAW 4 (1964), quotedin BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
702 (9th ed. 2009).
52. See Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure ofFiduciaryLaw, 91 B.U. L. REv. 1039,
1039 n. 1 (2011) (collecting scholarly authorities).
53. Frank H. Easterbrook& Daniel R. Fischel, ContractandFiduciaryDuty, 36 J.L. &ECON.
425, 440 (1993); accord Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 891 ("Judicial opinions applying the fiduciary constraint are also
distinctive, among private law cases, in that they frequently and explicitly use the language of
moral obligation to justify their outcomes.").
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by both imprecision in the legal standard and an inability of courts to define those
limitations.54 Several commentators have taken the view that judicial reliance on
metaphorical and analogistic thinking, rather than on context-based or situationspecific analysis, has hindered, rather than helped, courts in appropriately
determining whether particular relationships constitute fiduciary relationships or
not.55
B. Principlesof FiduciaryDuty ParticularlyRelevant to the K-12
Teacher-StudentRelationship
Irrespective of the breadth of one's definitional view concerning the term
"fiduciary," and in light of in loco parentis principles discussed previously,
several well-settled legal principles inform the analysis of whether K- 12 schools
and school personnel owe fiduciary obligations to students. First, it has long been
settled that "there may be [a] fiduciary relationship for one purpose and not for
another., 5 6 In addition, although parents may be considered fiduciaries to their
children in the context of paying child support or administering trust funds,57 the

54. J.A.C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary
Responsibilities, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 9, 11 (1987) ("By obscuring the limits of fiduciary
obligations under moralistic rhetoric and by verbally chastising those who are found to have
violated the standard, or come close to doing so, the courts seek to maintain the standard by
discouraging marginal behavior which might or might not violate it. It is the imprecision of the
standard and the fact that there are limitations on its scope which cannot be acknowledged in the
judicial formulations that lead the courts to employ excessive rhetorical force in promulgating
fiduciary doctrine .... Ambiguity breeds vehemence. Further, the knowledge that fiduciary
principles cannot be precisely and minutely enforced leads to the use of strong language as a
control mechanism.").
55. DeMott, supra note 53, at 879-80, 923-24; see also Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71
CALF. L. REv. 795, 805 (1983). DeMott, although recognizing that judicial reliance on
metaphorical reasoning when analyzing whether a fiduciary relationship exists is both "powerful"
and "inevitable," concludes,
Fiduciary obligation... continuing tie to Equity's legacy make it unusually contextbound as a legal obligation.... Determining whether fiduciary obligation applies in a
particular context and what requirements inhere in the imposition of fiduciary obligation
demands recognition of this situation-specificity.
Although... careful analysis can resolve many questions about fiduciary obligation,
the difficulty of that undertaking should not be underestimated. Shortcuts in legal
reasoning through metaphoric and unanalytic appeals to contract law serve only to
muddle the analysis. Only a move from metaphor to analysis can resolve these
recurrent questions of fiduciary obligation.
DeMott, supra note 53, at 891, 923-24.
56. Polaroid Corp. v. Homer, 197 F. Supp. 950, 956 (D.D.C. 1961) (quoting Gedge v.
Cromwell, 19 App. D.C. 192, 198 (D.C. 1902)).
57. In re Paxson Trust I, 893 A.2d 99, 118-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that the Paxsons
could not dispose of the premises in which they had interest as life tenants because they were, first
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parent-child relationship alone is typically insufficient to create a fiduciary
relationship. 8 Further, with certain exceptions in the corporate and partnership
arenas, judicial recognition of a fiduciary relationship places a higher duty of care
on a fiduciary than does the reasonable person standard under negligence
principles.59 Moreover, a fiduciary has a "duty of undivided loyalty" to the
person with whom he or she has a fiduciary relationship.60 In this latter regard,
a fiduciary must avoid or, at the very least, disclose conflicts of interests.6' Also,
while bad faith conduct may constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty owed by
a fiduciary,62 good faith intentions, except in the corporate or partnership
management context, will not absolve otherwise improper conduct.6 3 Thus, as
stated by one court, "[g]ood faith does not provide a defense to a claim of a
breach of these fiduciary duties; 'a pure heart and an empty head are not

and foremost, trustees and had a fiduciary obligation to act in the best interests of their children
with respect to the premises); Boyd v. Boyd, 545 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (holding
the mother had a fiduciary duty to use child support payments "for support").
58. Eagerton v. Fleming, 700 P.2d 1389, 1391-92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Cooper v. Cavallaro,
481 A.2d 101, 104 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984); La Salle Nat'l Bank v. 53rd-Ellis Currency Exch., Inc.,
618 N.E.2d 1103, 1112 (111. App. Ct. 1993); In re Koch, 849 P.2d 977, 999-1000 (Kan. Ct. App.
1993); Economopoulos v. Kolaitis, 528 S.E.2d 714, 718 (Va. 2000).
59. See, e.g., Marks v. Chicoine, No. C 06-06806 SI, 2007 WL 1056779, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 6, 2007) (stating that the "defendant ... owes plaintiff a fiduciary duty, an even higher
responsibility than that required under a negligence claim"); Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Steams & Co.,
No. 96 Civ. 4798(VM), 2000 WL 640625, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2000) ("[T]he standard of
conduct and the duty of care demanded of fiduciaries are set higher than that of ordinary care which
governs negligence."); Ford v. Brooks, No. 11 AP-664, 2012 WL 760741, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar.
8, 2012) ("A claim for breach of fiduciary duty is basically a negligence claim requiring a higher
standard of care."); Mafrige v. United States, 893 F. Supp. 691, 702 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (noting that
"a breach of a fiduciary duty or of a duty of utmost good faith... impose[s] higher standards...
than the duty of reasonable care associated with negligence law"). But cf IDAHO CODE ANN. § 533-404(c) (2012) (Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, "[a] partner's duty of care to the
partnership and the other partners in the conduct ... of the partnership business is limited to
refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a
knowing violation of law."); Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348,352-53 (Me. 1988) (noting that
under the business judgment rule, corporate officers-although fiduciaries-owe a duty of good
faith, rather than a duty of reasonable care, in managing corporate affairs).
60. Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (2d Cir. 1976); Prob. Ct. ex
rel.Lawton v. Bank of America, N.A., 813 F. Supp. 2d 277, 301 (D.R.I. 2011); Wolfv. Super. Ct.,
130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 860, 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
61. In re Brook Valley VII, 496 F.3d 892, 900-01 (8th Cir. 2007); Lifespan Corp. v. New
Eng. Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 06-cv-42 I-JNL, 2011 WL 2134286, at *23 (D.R.I. May 24,2011); IBEW
Local 98 Pension Fund v. Cent. Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., No. I 1-cv-222, 2012 WL 928402, at *13 (D.
Vt. Mar. 19, 2012).
62. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006).
63. Ertel v. O'Brien, 852 S.W.2d 17, 22 (Tex. App. 1993).
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enough."'" And, courts have invariably found the existence and breach of a
fiduciary duty where a person in a position of authority in a relationship of trust
and confidence-such as an attorney-client, physician-patient or group home
supervisor-ward relationship-exploits his or her authoritative position by
engaging in sexual relations with the more vulnerable person in the relationship.6 5
III. CASES AND SCHOLARSHIP/COMMENTARY DISCUSSING WHETHER K-12
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL PERSONNEL OWE A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO STUDENTS

A. The Case Law
Notwithstanding the longstanding judicial treatment of the in loco parentis
doctrine as granting rights to school supervisory personnel and only secondarily
and minimally protecting the rights of students, a surprising split has developed
in the case law over the past twenty-five years concerning whether schools and
school supervisory personnel owe a fiduciary duty to primary and secondary
students.66 This Article will now chronicle that judicial split. It will first discuss
the cases refusing to recognize a fiduciary relationship between teachers and
students in the K-12 setting. It will next discuss the cases acknowledging the
possibility of (or, at least, not definitively rejecting) a fiduciary relationship in
that setting, but finding no such relationship on the facts or allegations of the
specific case before the court. Finally, this Article will discuss the cases that
recognize the existence of a fiduciary relationship and likewise find such a
relationship on the facts or allegations of the case before the court. Within each
discussion, the Article will first examine cases relying on or referring to the in
loco parentis doctrine before considering cases that reach the same conclusion
without mentioning the doctrine.
1. Cases CategoricallyRefusing to Recognize the Existence of a Fiduciary
Relationship Between K-12 Schools and School Supervisory Personnel and
Students.a. In loco parentiscases.-In Franchiv. New Hampton School,67 the mother
of a student, who had been discharged from a private boarding school for reasons

64. DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 410,418 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Donovan v.
Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983)).

65. Doe v. Harbor Schs., Inc., 843 N.E.2d 1058, 1064-65 (Mass. 2006) (group home
supervisor-ward relationship); Hoopes v. Hammargren, 725 P.2d 238, 242-43 (Nev. 1986)
(physician-patient relationship); Allen Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. Bartels, 924 N.E.2d 833,835 (Ohio 2010)
(attorney-client relationship).
66. One appellate panel, in discussing (but without resolving the issue of) the existence of
a fiduciary relationship between a public school and a middle and high school student in a sexual
abuse case involving the possible tolling ofthe statute of limitations, "note[d] that whether a public
school has a fiduciary duty to a middle or high school student is contested by the parties and not
settled law." Dymit v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #717, No. A04-471, 2004 WL 2857375, at *5 n. 1 (Minn.
Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2004).
67. 656 F. Supp. 2d 252 (D.N.H. 2009) (internal citation omitted).
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related to an alleged eating disorder, sued the school under various theories,
including a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.68
The district court dismissed Franchi's breach of fiduciary duty claim, stating
as follows:
NHS argues that no fiduciary relationship existed between it and [the
student] as a matter of law. Franchi's argument to the contrary is based
on the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in Schneider v.
Plymouth State College, that "[i]n the context of sexual harassment by
faculty members, the relationship between a post-secondary institution
and its students is a fiduciary one." This case, however, involves neither
a post-secondary institution nor sexual harassment by faculty members.
This court predicts that the New Hampshire Supreme Court would not
expand the obligations imposed by Schneiderbeyond its context and into
the circumstances here.

As a matter of law, then, the nature of the duty owed from NHS-a
secondary school-to [the student] was a duty of care arising out of its in
loco parentis status . . . rather than a fiduciary duty arising from any
"unique relationship" as in Schneider.

In line with these authorities, this court rules that, even if the
allegations of Franchi's amended complaint suggest that she placed "a
special trust or reliance" in NHS on [the student]'s behalf, that was
insufficient to give rise to a fiduciary duty. Though NHS, like any other
secondary school, owes its students a duty to use reasonable care to
protect them, this court predicts that the New Hampshire Supreme Court
would not extend its holding in Schneider to elevate that duty to a
fiduciary one under the circumstances alleged here. NHS's motion to
dismiss Franchi's claim for breach of fiduciary duty is granted.69
In Doe v. Greenville County School District,7" the parents of a fourteen-yearold student brought claims (among others) for breach of fiduciary duty and breach
of an assumed duty in loco parentis against a school district after a substitute

68. Id. at 255-56.
69. Id. at 261-65 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also Brodeur v.
Claremont Sch. Dist., 626 F. Supp. 2d 195, 219 n.24 (D.N.H. 2009) (strongly suggesting, but not
deciding, that because the New Hampshire Supreme Court had held that the relationship between
a secondary school and student is "a special relationship" based on the in loco parentis doctrine
"that gives rise to a duty enforceable in negligence," "New Hampshire [law] does not appear to
treat the relationship between a public secondary school and its students as fiduciary in nature").
70. 651 S.E.2d 305 (S.C. 2007).
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teacher hired by the school district had been convicted of having sexual relations
with their minor daughter.7 After the trial court dismissed these two claims and
several others, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
In the instant case, the trial court found that Mr. and Mrs. Doe's
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of an assumed duty in
loco parentis were based only on their claim of negligent supervision.
The trial court further found that these causes of action were alleged as
an attempt to heighten any duty owed by the School District in this
situation.
We agree with the trial court's analysis of these causes of action.
The Legislature has clearly provided that the School District may be
liable for negligent supervision of a student only if that duty was
executed in a grossly negligent manner. Mr. and Mrs. Doe have not
alleged any facts under which this Court could find another duty owed
by the School District other than the duty of supervision as outlined by
the Tort Claims Act.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in dismissing the
causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of an assumed
duty in loco parentis.72
b. Non-in loco parentis cases.-In Thomas v. Board of Education of
Brandywine School District,73 the parents of an elementary school student filed
an action on the student's behalf against a school district's board of education, its
board members, and superintendent, alleging that school administrators failed to
take appropriate steps to prevent a teacher from sexually abusing the student.74
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district defendants
on the parents' breach of fiduciary duty claim, holding as follows:
Finally, Plaintiff also alleges a novel theory of liability based on the
"special relationship" between public school administrators and their
students. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the School District
Defendants "owed fiduciary duties" to the District's students, including
Plaintiff, duties which the School District Defendants "grossly
breached." Both parties concede that this is an issue of first impression
in Delaware.
Little more need be said about Plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty
claim beyond the undisputed fact that Plaintiff can cite to no authority for
recognizing this theory under Delaware law.... Plaintiff provides no

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 306.
Id. at 309-10 (citation omitted).
759 F. Supp. 2d 477 (D. Del. 2010).
Id. at 481.
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basis for predicting that the Delaware Supreme Court would accept
Plaintiff's invitation to be the first state to recognize a fiduciary
relationship between a public school district and its students.

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that there is a "confidential"
relationship of any sort, nor does Plaintiff allege that there is a special
relationship of dependency between him and the School District
Defendants. While there may be, as Plaintiff contends, cases from other
states that recognize a "special relationship" between public schools and
their students, none of these cases explicitly identify a fiduciary
relationship, nor state that a student may pursue civil litigation for breach
of such a fiduciary relationship.
The Court concludes that Delaware law does not recognize a
fiduciary relationship between a public school district and its students.
Consequently, the Court will grant summary judgment to the School
District Defendants on Plaintiff s claim for breach of fiduciary duty.75
Likewise, in Key v. Coryell,76 the mother of a special needs student brought
suit, individually and on behalf of the student, against a Catholic school, its
current and former principal, two teachers, several other individuals, and the
Catholic Diocese.77 In her complaint, the mother alleged that the school did not
meet the student's needs and, because of his alleged behavioral problems, forced
him to withdraw from the school in violation of, among other legal duties, a
fiduciary duty owed to the student.7" The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the entire complaint, holding with respect to the breach
of fiduciary claim:

75. Id. at 503-04; see also C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d
283, 292 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (where student alleged that school district and school personnel, by
not preventing or by participating in sexual relations with the student, engaged in constructive fraud
which, under California law, requires proof of a fiduciary or confidential relationship, and where
the Court of Appeal stated that the student did "not cite, and we have not found, any authority
stating that a fiduciary relationship exists between a school district and an individual student," the
Court refused to recognize the existence of a fiduciary relationship in the K- 12 school and school
personnel-student relationship), rev'd on other grounds, 270 P.3d 699 (Cal. 2012); John R. v.
Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 240 Cal. Rptr. 319, 325 (Ct. App. 1987) (In a sexual abuse case
involving delayed discovery/fraudulent concealment issues, another California Court of Appeal
panel stated that "[t]eachers, while not fiduciaries, are professionals who occupy a special
relationship with adolescent students invoking higher obligations."), aff'din part,rev'dinpart, 769
P.2d 948 (Cal. 1989).
76. 185 S.W.3d 98 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004).
77. Id. at 101.
78. Id at 101-02.
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Appellant further argues, without citation to any supporting authority,
that the relationship of a student with special needs and an educator who
represents that he or a school can meet those needs and provide an
education appropriate for the student's age and grade level is of a
fiduciary nature. We are aware of no case in Arkansas that supports
appellant's argument.... In Cherepskiv. Walker, the supreme court held
that a defendant priest did not owe a fiduciary duty to a parishioner. We
cannot say that appellees owed appellant and Taylor any greater duty
than a priest owes a parishioner.... '9
In Eng v. Hargrave,0 one of the more recent judicial decisions discussing the
issue, a federal district court dismissed, with prejudice, a complaint involving a
claim by the plaintiff against his student in an unspecified endeavor relating to the
martial arts.8 In so doing, the district court stated that "a teacher ordinarily does
not owe his student a fiduciary duty, and a student presumably owes his teacher

even less."8 2
2.

Cases Recognizing the Possibility of (or, at Least, Not Definitively

Rejecting) a Fiduciary Relationship Between K-12 Schools and School
Supervisory Personneland Students, but Not FindingSuch Relationship on the
Allegations or Facts Before It.a. In loco parentis cases.-In Bass ex rel. Bass v. Miss Porter'sSchool,83 a

student who had been expelled from a private high school for dishonesty and
alcohol use, after requesting medical leave relating to harassment she had
suffered at school, brought suit against the school and the head of the school.84
In her complaint, the student alleged that the defendants' expulsion decision and
their conduct leading up to it, among other legal theories, breached a fiduciary
duty owed to the student.8 5 The district court disagreed, finding and concluding

79. Id. at 106 (citation omitted); see also J.W. v. Johnston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 5:11-cv707-D, 2012 WL 4425439, at *15 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 24, 2012) (because North Carolina law did not
recognize a fiduciary relationship between school board or school administrators and middle school
students, North Carolina federal district court dismissed breach of fiduciary duty claim brought by
middle school special education student); Cook v. Kudlacz, 974 N.E.2d 706, 724 (Ohio Ct. App.
2012) (because "no case... provides that a coach would definitely have a fiduciary relationship
with [a] player," court affirmed trial court's grant of summary judgment against high school tennis
team member and her mother on their breach of fiduciary duty claim against private religious
school and school personnel).
80. No. C 10-01776 RS, 2012 WL 116560 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2012).
81. Id. at*1.
82. Id. at *2; see also Zimmerman v. Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 888 F. Supp. 2d 317, 335
n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (in a case alleging sexual abuse at a private school, the court stated that
"[t]hough the plaintiffs denominate their claim as one for breach of fiduciary duty, New York
courts do not describe the duty of a school to its students as such").
83. 738 F. Supp. 2d 307 (D. Conn. 2010).
84. Id.at 310-11, 327-28.
85. Id. at 330.
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as follows:
Plaintiff argues that "the context of the present case" shows there to
be a question for the jury as to the existence of a fiduciary duty: "Tatum
was a minor child in a boarding school, which was expected to provide
care, supervision, and protection at all times, to meet students' physical
and emotional needs." Neither these facts, nor the remainder of the
record, demonstrate or suggest that Porter's owed Tatum a fiduciary
duty. The facts do not show that "that [Porter's] undertook to act
primarily for the benefit of [Tatum]."... Even if Plaintiff could establish
a relationship of unique trust or confidence in one or more of the specific
adults who supervised her-her dormitory mother, academic advisors, or
teachers-these individuals are not defendants, and the record shows
Windsor, the only individual defendant, not to have had substantial
contact with Plaintiff prior to the incidents at issue in this suit, and
therefore not to support any conclusion that the Windsor-Tatum
relationship was characterized by such trust or confidence.
Because the record, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
does not show that either of the named Defendants owed any fiduciary
duty to Plaintiff, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count
9.86

In L.C. v. CentralPennsylvania Youth Ballet,87 the parents of a private school
student brought a multi-count complaint against the school, one of its faculty
members, and the parents of another student stemming from an alleged sexual
assault against their son.88 Among other claims, the parents of the student
suffering the assault alleged that the school had breached contractual obligations
that it owed to them under a student handbook. 89 Although the district court
dismissed the breach of contract claim, it opined that the school may have
breached a fiduciary duty:
At this juncture, we note that "school districts are charged with the
responsibility of supervising children under their control during the time
that they are at school under the doctrine of in loco parentis to protect
children." Accordingly, since L.C. was a student at CPYB, we believe
that CPYB may have incurred afiduciaryduty to protect L.C. from harm.
However, Plaintiffs have failed to lodge a claim for breach offiduciary
duty, electing instead to pursue a claim for breach of alleged contractual
duty. As stated above, Plaintiffs have failed to adequately aver that
CPYB was contractuallyobligated to ensure the welfare of its students.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 330-31 (first and second alterations in original) (citations omitted).
No. 1:09-cv-2076, 2010 WL 2650640 (M.D. Pa. July 2, 2010).
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *4.
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be granted.9"
b. Non-in loco parentis cases.-In Stotts v. Eveleth,9 an eighteen-year-old
high school student brought an action against a school district and a junior high
school teacher alleging, among other claims, that the teacher breached a fiduciary
duty when they engaged in a consensual sexual relationship.92 The Iowa Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
teacher, holding as follows:
Stotts also contends that a fiduciary relationship existed between
Eveleth and her, and for that reason Eveleth owed Stotts a duty to refrain
from sexual contact with her. That duty, she argues, is based on a
teacher's general duty to act in the best interest of a student. Stotts
asserts that Eveleth abused his position as a teacher and the trust she as
a student placed in him by taking sexual advantage of her. Therefore,
Stotts concludes, the district court erred in finding (1) that a fiduciary
duty does not automatically exist between a teacher and student and (2)
as a matter of law no such duty existed between Eveleth and her.

Because the circumstances giving rise to a fiduciary duty are so diverse,
whether such a duty exists depends on the facts and circumstances of
each case.
Here, it is uncontroverted that Eveleth was not Stotts's teacher and
never had been. In addition, Stotts generated no genuine issue of
material fact on whether she reposed faith, confidence, and trust in
Eveleth; that she relied on his judgment and advice; or that he dominated
and influenced her. The uncontroverted facts are that the relationship
was simply one of a sexual nature between two consenting adults. We
therefore agree with the district court that as a matter of law no fiduciary
duty existed.93

90. Id. at *5 n. 11; see also Bernie v. Catholic Diocese, 821 N.W.2d 232, 242 (S.D. 2012)
(affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of a Catholic Diocese where boarding school
students "failed to establish the existence of an in loco parentis or fiduciary relationship" with the
Diocese).
91. 688 N.W.2d 803 (Iowa 2004).
92. Id. at 805-06.
93. Id. at 811 (citation omitted). Although the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the
teacher's conduct did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, the teacher's conduct, which
involved sexual relations with a current student, almost certainly violated Iowa's Code of
Professional Conduct and Ethics for educators because the teacher engaged in "acts or behavior"
that constituted "[c]ommitting or soliciting any sexual or otherwise indecent act with a student or
any minor" and "[s]oliciting, encouraging, or consummating a romantic or otherwise inappropriate
relationship with a student." IOWA BD. OF EDUC. EXAMINERS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
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Likewise, in Walsh v. Krantz,94 a father filed a law suit on behalf of his
middle school student sons against a school district and a number of school
employees alleging, among other claims, breach of fiduciary based on the school
employees having made recommendations to the father concerning one son's
evaluation for learning disabilities and the other son's assignment to a lower
grade level in math, which recommendations the father rejected. 95 The district
court dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claim, holding,
Assuming, arguendo, that a fiduciary relationship exists between
defendants and each of Walsh's sons, the breach of fiduciary duty claims
nonetheless fail.
* * * The amended complaint alleges that Weinberg and Heisey
breached a fiduciary duty by ordering the Special Education Office to
deliver a request for evaluation of C.R.W. to Walsh each year that
C.R.W. is in the Dallastown Area schools and that Stone and Anderson
breached a fiduciary duty by attempting to assign S.J.W. to a lower grade
level in math and refusing to discuss the matter with Walsh. The court
finds that such conduct is not a breach of any fiduciary duty. Notably,
the alleged conduct involved recommendationsby defendants that Walsh
could, and in fact did, refuse. As the amended complaint and brief in
opposition reveal, C.R.W. and S.J.W. experienced no actual change in
their educational status at school. Walsh's mere disagreement with the
educational recommendations and practices, without more, does not
transform them into breaches of a fiduciary duty.96
The court of appeals affirmed, adopting the reasoning of the district court. 97
Lastly, the United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue
of whether K-12 teachers owe a fiduciary duty to students. In Gebser v. Lago
Vista Independent School District,98 the Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that

ETHICS, ch. 25, §§ 282-25.3(1)e.(3) and (4); see also Nkemakolam ex rel. K.N. v. St. John's
Military Sch., 890 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1263-64 (D. Kan. 2012) (refusing to allow parents of private
school students to amend complaint to add cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against
school president where parents failed to sufficiently allege facts under exception to teacher
immunity statute); MenachemS. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., No. B183336, 2006 WL 1381656, at
*11 (Cal. Ct. App. May 22, 2006) (holding that a mother and her son, a student in a private
religious school, had failed to plead facts suggesting a breach of fiduciary duty by the school
district and a public school teacher for not protecting the student from sexual abuse by another
teacher employed by the private school).
94. No. 1:07-cv-0616, 2008 WL 3981492 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2008), affd, 386 Fed. Appx.
334 (3d Cir. 2010).
95. Id. at *1-2.
96. Id. at *7 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).
97. Walsh, 386 Fed. Appx. at 341.
98. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
AND
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students do not possess a private right of action to sue school districts and
teachers for sexual harassment under Title IX,absent actual notice or deliberate
indifference of the harassment by school officials." Four Justices, in an opinion
written by Justice Stevens, disagreed. °0 The dissenters, without using the term
"fiduciary," but very much describing "fiduciary-like" circumstances, believed
that a private right of action should be available to students, stating as follows:
This case presents a paradigmatic example of a tort that was made
possible, that was effected, and that was repeated over a prolonged
period because of the powerful influence that Waldrop had over Gebser
by reason of the authority that his employer, the school district, had
delegated to him. As a secondary school teacher, Waldrop exercised
even greater authority and control over his students than employers and
supervisors exercise over their employees. His gross misuse of that
authority allowed him to abuse his young student's trust.10 1
3. Cases Recognizing a FiduciaryRelationship Between K-12 Schools and
School Personneland Students.a. In loco parentis cases.-In McMahon v. Randolph-Macon Academy, °2
McMahon was a boarding school student at Randolph-Macon Academy who
claimed "that a staff member developed a sexual relationship with her and that
this conduct, among other things, violated a fiduciary duty which the school owed
to her."'0 3 McMahon brought suit on this theory, and defendants filed a demurrer
seeking dismissal of the claim."° The trial court allowed McMahon to proceed
on her breach of fiduciary duty claim, stating as follows:
[T]he defendants rely upon Abrams v. Mary Washington College for the
proposition that "there is no in loco parentis relationship or any other
fiduciary relationship between senior college officials and every student
attending that institution." This court believes that a different rule
applies to a boarding school which takes minors into its custody.

The significance of imposing fiduciary duties upon an agent is that
it restricts the permissible range of the agent's actions and requires that
the agent act solely in the interests of his principal. 5
The court noted that courts have previously found the existence of fiduciary

99. Id. at 277.
100. Id.at 293-306 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
101. Id.at 299.
102. No. 97-11, 1997 WL 33616521 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 16, 1997).
103. Id. at *1.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citations omitted) (citing Greenwood Assoc. v. Crestar Bank, 448 S.E.2d 399 (Va.
1994); Hooper v. Musolino, 364 S.E.2d 207 (Va. 1988)).
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rights and duties in relationships such as between a banker and customer during
foreclosure proceedings and between business partners.10 6 As such, the court
believed that "the relationship between a boarding school and its minor student
has the same dignity under the law as the relationship between a bank and its
customers and that between partners"'10 7 and concluded as follows:
Applying these principles to the present case it would appear that in its
dealings with its students that a boarding school for minors does act in
loco parentis and that where a choice exists between the interests of a
staff member and the best interests of a student that the school must
choose to act in the student's best interests ....As noted by the court
during the oral argument and by the defendants in their memorandum, it
would appear that the breach of fiduciary duty action is subsumed with
the negligence counts of the motion for judgment, so the practical effect
of this ruling remains to be demonstrated.l0 8
Also, in In re the Arbitration Between Howell Public Schools and Howell
EducationAssociation,"°9 a teacher grieved a school board's decision to suspend
her for one year based on alleged unethical conduct for her having received
compensation (per student commissions and chaperone fees) from a travel
company for having booked a trip with it to Washington, D. C. for her middle
school students. The arbitrator denied the grievance, opining as follows
concerning the school district's contention that the teacher breached a fiduciary
obligation owed to her students:
The grievant has challenged the employer's claim that she had a
fiduciary relationship to the students as she acted in the dual role of
teacher and tour director. However, the grievant herself testified that
when she was in charge of the children on a trip she stood in the place of
the student's parents. Beyond that there is a special relationship of trust
between a teacher and a pupil. The teacher's role is one of in loco
parentis. In this status the teacher is bound to take reasonable care of the
students in his/her custody. This responsibility creates a fiduciary duty,

106. Id.at *2.
107. Id.
108. Id.Although the trial court believed that plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim would
be subsumed by her negligence claim, as discussed previously, proof of a breach of fiduciary duty
claim would impose a higher duty on a defendant than would proof of a negligence claim. See
supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also Daly v. Derrick, 281 Cal. Rptr. 709, 717-18 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991) (holding that "[a] teacher, who stands in loco parentis has a fiduciary or confidential
relationship to his or her students and assumes a corresponding duty of disclosure" (internal citation
omitted)); Nelson v. Turner, 256 S.W.3d 37,41 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (holding, in a case regarding
a teacher's negligent supervision and failure to report an elementary school girl's sexual assault,
that "[a] special, fiduciary quasi-parental relationship is created as a practical matter under such
circumstances").
109. 1991 WL 692932 (Arb.) (1991) (Brown, Arb.).
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that is[,] there is a relationship of trust which can be relied upon by the
students. A teacher who takes financial advantage of this relationship
may be guilty of unethical conduct. The standards of the teaching
profession would be violated if this role of trust is abused."'
And, in State v. Evans,"' at a re-sentencing hearing for a public high school
teacher convicted of trafficking in cocaine, the trial judge stated as a basis for
sentencing the teacher to consecutive, rather than concurrent, terms that "[y]our
[sic] were in a fiduciary relationship with the public, serving in loco parentis for
all of Clyde High School."' 2 The appellate court affirmed, finding and
concluding that the trial court's reasoning based on the in loco parentis doctrine
supported its sentencing decision." 3
b. Non-in loco parentis cases.-In Doe v. Terwilliger,' "4 a student brought
a breach of fiduciary duty claim against her high school coaches, Terwilliger and
Ford, stemming from sexual contact between the student and Terwilliger that
occurred while she was a student-athlete." 5 The Judge Trial Referee denied
Terwilliger's motion to strike, ruling as follows:
It is well established that "[a] fiduciary or confidential relationship
is characterized by a unique degree of trust and confidence between the
parties, one of whom has superior knowledge, skill or expertise and is
under a duty to represent the interest of the other ...The superior
position of the fiduciary or dominant party affords him great opportunity
for abuse of the confidence reposed in him."

In the present case, the plaintiff alleges the following: "Terwilliger
was a coach (and is) employed by the Guilford Public Schools during all
relevant times . . . Terwilliger was plaintiff's coach, mentor, and/or
confidant for several years ...Between the late fall of 2005 and the
spring of 2006, defendant Gary Terwilliger committed numerous acts of
harmful and/or offensive touching on the person of plaintiff Jane Doe, a
then minor." The complaint goes on to allege several other incidents of
harmful and offensive touching and harassment by the defendant. Count
six specifically alleges: Terwilliger, as plaintiffs public school coach,
mentor and confidant, a position of trust and confidence and superiority
by defendant. . . and was in a fiduciary relationship with plaintiff...
Terwilliger breached his fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff Jane Doe when
he willfully and repeatedly engaged in harmful and offensive conduct

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. (citation omitted).
No. S-00-016, 2000 WL 1643515 (Ohio Ct. App.Nov.3,2000).
Id. at *1.
Id.at *3.
No. CV095024692S, 2010 WL 2926168 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 8, 2010).
Id.at *1.
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against the plaintiff ....
Given the plaintiffs allegations in this case, the court is satisfied that she
has plead sufficient facts to allege the existence of a fiduciary
relationship between herself and the defendant and as a result, denies the
defendant's motion. The court is persuaded by the Supreme Court's
disinclination to confine the fiduciary duty doctrine to a precise
definition and its willingness to allow for case-by-case analysis in new
situations.
The court is further persuaded by the fact that Connecticut courts,
addressing the existence of a fiduciary relationship, attach significance
to whether the plaintiff was a minor and additionally, draw a line
between a typical student-teacher relationship and those relationships that
include "something more," namely acts of fraud, misconduct or
misappropriation on behalf ofthe superior party. Given the collaborative
nature of the relationship between a public school coach and a studentathlete, and that the minor plaintiff has alleged that the defendant, her
"mentor and confidant," engaged in several acts of sexual misconduct
is convinced that more factual development is
and harassment, the court
1 16
warranted in this case.
In Vicky M v. NortheasternEducationalIntermediate Unit 19,'" the parents
of an autistic student filed a fourteen-count complaint against a school district, an
educational intermediate unit, various supervisory employees and officials, and
a special education teacher who allegedly used aversive techniques and restraints
on autistic students.118 In addition to claims under special education law and the
United States Constitution, the parents alleged a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty against the student's special education teacher under Pennsylvania law."1 9
The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss as it pertained to the
breach of fiduciary duty claim, holding that
[u]nder Pennsylvania law, "[t]he general test for determining the
existence of... a [fiduciary] relationship is whether it is clear that the
parties did not deal on equal terms." Indeed, a fiduciary relationship "is
not confined to any specific association of the parties." Rather, a
fiduciary relationship will be found to exist "when the circumstances
make it certain the parties do not deal on equal terms, but, on the one side

116. Id.at *1, *4 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). Less than two months later,
another judge of the same court, relying on the same reasoning discussed above, denied a motion
to strike the student's claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the other coach, Ford, who had
allegedly facilitated the student's contact with Terwilliger. Doe v. Terwilliger, No.CV095024692,
2010 WL 3327861, at *1-2 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 29, 2010).
117. 486 F. Supp. 2d 437 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
118. Id.
at 445-47.
119. Id. at 446, 451.
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there is an overmastering influence, or, on the other, weakness,
dependence, or trust, justifiably reposed; in both an unfair advantage is
possible.".. . Failure to act in the other's interest results in breach of the
duty imposed by the fiduciary relationship.
Certainly, Defendant Wzorek, as the special education teacher in
charge of the instruction of Minor-Plaintiff AJM, a child with autism,
was in an overmastering position in this relationship, and was trusted and
depended upon by AJM to exercise sound judgment in handling his care
and instruction. Consequently, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the Plaintiffs, Defendant Wzorek's motion to dismiss this Count must
be denied. 2 '
Finally, in Rocci v. Ecole Secondaire MacDonald-Cartier,2' a teacher

brought a defamation action against a teacher-chaperone and the school, alleging
that the chaperone's letter to the teacher's principal, which criticized the teacher's
supervisory conduct of students on a school trip, was defamatory.122 The New
Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on
the teacher's defamation claim based, in part, on the teacher's characterization of
her duty to students as fiduciary in nature. 123 According to the court,
[i]n her supplemental brief, plaintiff acknowledges that defendant's
letter implicates a matter of public concern. More specifically, she states
that her "role was one as a fiduciary charged with the care of her
students. On its face, the letter appears to concern itself with the students
[sic] well being." In view of that fiduciary role and the public interest,
we believe that there must be free discourse, commentary, and criticism
regarding a teacher's professionalism and behavior during a schoolsponsored event. That principle, which is at the heart of this case, tips
the scale in favor of requiring plaintiff to allege more than mere
embarrassment to survive summary judgment. Hence, although a private
figure, plaintiff is required to allege and prove pecuniary or reputational
harm. 124

120. Id. at 458-59 (first, second, and third alterations in original) (citations omitted). For
additional decisions in cases brought by other plaintiffs against the same defendants where the court
denied motions to dismiss claims for breach of fiduciary duty on identical grounds, see Joseph M.
v. Ne. Educ. Intermediate Unit 19,516 F. Supp. 2d 424,442-43 (M.D. Pa. 2007); Sanford D. v. Ne.
Educ. Intermediate Unit 19, No. 3:06-CV-019042007, WL 1450310, at *15-16 (M.D. Pa. May 15,
2007); Kimberly F. v. Ne. Educ. Intermediate Unit 19, No. 3:06-CV-01902, 2007 WL 1450364,
at *15-16 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2007). Also, for a decision by the same court denying defendant
Wzorek's motion for summaryjudgment on the breach offiduciary duty claim, see Vicky M. v. Ne.
Educ. Intermediate Unit, 689 F. Supp. 2d 721, 739-40 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
121. 755 A.2d 583 (N.J. 2000).
122. Id. at 584-85.

123. Id. at 587.
124. Id. (alteration in original).
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B. Scholarship/Commentary
1. Scholarship/Commentary Indirectly Discussing the K-12 Fiduciary
Relationship Issue.-The split in judicial opinion concerning whether or not a
fiduciary relationship exists between K- 12 schools and school personnel and their
students has not been replicated in the scholarship addressing the issue. Instead,
the vast majority of commentators, although invariably addressing the fiduciary
relationship issue only indirectly and in broader discussions concerning sexual
abuse or sexual harassment, have assumed or opined that primary and secondary
school teachers are fiduciaries to their student charges-primarily because of the
power that teachers hold, the trust placed in them by society, parents and students,
and the vulnerability of students. 125 Certainly, some of those commentators have
hedged their bets, characterizing the K-12 teacher-student relationship as
"fiduciary-like"' 126 or "fiduciary-type'" 27 or "resembl[ing] a fiduciary
relationship.' ' 28 Other commentators, however-again, in discussing broader
issues and not analyzing the fiduciary relationship issue in detail-have been far
less equivocal: those commentators have stated that "[t]eachers are fiduciaries
who hold the trust, intellectual development, and academic advancement of their
students in their hands;' ' 29 that "the role of a teacher is that of a fiduciary, and.
. leaders of our children... "130 and that, "in the context of sexual victimization,
fiduciaries include employers, clergy,
teachers, youth leaders, professors,
' 31
attorneys and other professionals.'
2. Scholarship/Commentary Directly Discussing the K-12 Fiduciary
RelationshipIssue.-Those scholars who have directly addressed the issue are far
fewer, but have likewise urged or concluded that K-12 teachers owe a fiduciary

125. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Jury 'sRole in DecidingNormativeIssues in the American
Common Law, 68 FoRDHAM L. REV. 407, 483 (1999); Stefanie H. Roth, Sex Discrimination101:
Developinga Title IXAnalysis for Sexual Harassmentin Education, 23 J.L. & EDUC. 459, 509-10
(1994); Carrie N. Baker, Sexual Extortion: CriminalizingQuidPro Quo Sexual Harassment, 13
LAW & INEQ. 213, 242 n.203 (1994); Neera Rellan Stacy, Note, Seeking a Superior Institutional
LiabilityStandardUnder Title IXfor Teacher-StudentSexual Harassment,71 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1338,
1342, 1372 (1996); Kimberly A. Lake, Casenote, FirstAmendment-Freedom ofSpeech-Where
Alleged Defamatory Speech Implicates a Matter of Public Interest, Reputational or Pecuniary
Harm May Not Be PresumedAbsent a Showing of Actual Malice - Rocci v. Ecole Secondaire
MacDonald-Cartier, 755 A.2d 583 (N.J. 2000), 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 887, 911 (2001);
GregoryM. Posner-Weber, SexualAbuse by Professionals:A Legal Guide,69-NOV Wis. LAW. 59,
60 (1996) (reviewing STEVEN B. BISBING ET AL., SEXUAL ABUSE BY PROFESSIONALS: A LEGAL
GUIDE (1995)).
126. Gergen, supra note 125.
127. Stacy, supra note 125, at 1342, 1372.
128. Baker,supra note 125, at 242 n.203.
129. Roth, supra note 125, at 509-10.
130. Lake, supra note 125, at 911.
131. Posner-Weber, supra note 125, at 60 (emphasis added).
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duty to students-although they differ as to whether the duty is ethical and/or
moral, as opposed to legal.' 32 Thus, one scholar has focused on the teacher's
fiduciary role as ethical and moral, stating as follows:
This article proposes that the relationship between teacher and
student is fiduciary. It develops the thesis that a primary or secondary
school teacher has especially high duties to the student: obligations,
resembling those of a guardian, a trustee, an executor, and an attorney,
of fidelity, zealous devotion to the well-being of the other party, and full
disclosure. This article does not endorse this approach for the positive
law. It is not here proposed that teachers be held legally liable for
violations of those obligations. The topic of this article, rather, is ethics.
The teacher, it is here proposed, is morally a fiduciary.'33
Two other scholars, in the most comprehensive article on the teacher-student
fiduciary relationship issue yet written, have assumed, both historically and
currently, that fiduciary relationships existed, and will exist, between teachers and
students in certain circumstances. 134 Those scholars have noted the shortcomings
of applying "[t]raditional [d]octrinal [a]pproaches" such as the duty of care and
loyalty in resolving fiduciary duty cases in the education setting. 35 Focusing
primarily on college and university case law and issues, these scholars have
developed the following "underlying organizing principles"' 136 in determining
when a fiduciary relationship exists between a teacher and student, the nature of
the fiduciary duty involved, and the existence and magnitude of any breach of
that duty:
[I]n determining the likelihood of legal liability for an alleged breach of
fiduciary duty, one should engage in three inter-related enquiries. (1)
The first enquiry involves considering and analyzing a set of factors and
indicia to determine whether a fiduciary relationship between two parties
exists and, more importantly, the magnitude of duty that arises within
that particular relationship and context. Such an enquiry helps determine
whether a fiduciary in a particular situation owes a relatively high or
relatively low degree of duty. (2) The second enquiry involves analyzing
a related set of factors and indicia that will help determine the height or

132. See, e.g., Scott FitzGibbon, EducationalJusticeand the Recognition of Marriage,2011
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 263, 274-76; Brett G. Scharffs & John W. Welch, An Analytic Frameworkfor
Understandingand Evaluatingthe FiduciaryDuty ofEducators,2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 159, 163-

65; Commentators in Canada likewise view the K-12 teacher-student relationship as fiduciary in
nature. See, e.g., Jim Davies, Sexual Abuse of Children by Teachers:A CanadianPerspectiveon
Directand Vicarious Employer Liability, 11 EDUC. & L.J. 131 (2001-2002); G. V. La Forest, OffDuty Conduct and the Fiduciary Obligationsof Teachers, 8 EDUC.& L. J. 119 (1997).

133.
134.
135.
136.

FitzGibbon, supranote 132, at 263.
Scharffs & Welch, supra note 132, at 159-64.
Id. at 165-66.
Id. at 166.
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degree of the fiduciary's behavior. (3) The third step is to measure the
amplitude of the fiduciary's performance to determine the extent to
which that conduct exceeded or fell short of the required level of
performance. If there has been a shortfall or breach of duty, this enquiry
then determines the amount or type of appropriate remedies. This step
also considers how easy or difficult it would have been for the fiduciary
to fulfill his or her duty, whether there are any special reasons why a
court should not get involved in second guessing the fiduciary or
substituting its judgment for that of the fiduciary, and whether there is an
available remedy that would be appropriate in rectifying or at least
ameliorating the effects of the breach of duty.
This approach to analyzing fiduciary duties is helpful in several
ways. It inherently recognizes that all fiduciary duties are not created
equal, and that all breaches will not be regarded as equally harmful. For
example, by conducting this type of analysis we learn that courts are
most likely to find liability in cases involving duties of a high magnitude
coupled with breaches of a high magnitude and where there is an
available appropriate remedy. Conversely, if a low-degree duty is
coupled with a low-degree breach and there is no remedy that seems
appropriate for the situation, courts are unlikely to impose legal liability.
Cases involving a high degree of duty and a low degree breach, or cases
involving a low degree duty and a serious breach prove to be the most
difficult situations in which to predict outcomes; but even in such cases,
the approach outlined below allows lawyers, judges, and litigants to
identify and produce all the evidence systematically relevant to a sound
resolution of the case. In all cases, this approach identifies specific,
quantifiable elements that allow judges, lawyers, and administrators to
marshal the evidence and make reasonable judgments in calculating the
magnitude of duty owed and the degree of violation of duty that may
have occurred.'37
Specifically, the authors identified the factors alluded to above as follows:
As is the case in each unique context, some of the factors that contribute
to an analysis of the magnitude of duties and the magnitude of breaches
are of particular significance in the educational setting. For example, in
assessing magnitude of duties and breaches in the educational context,
the following considerations are often important: the degree of actual
power or control entrusted to the fiduciary, the age and vulnerability of
the beneficiary, the experience and sophistication of both the fiduciary
and the beneficiary, the formality in the creation of the agreement
between the fiduciary and beneficiary, the history and duration of the
relationship, the degree and cause of reliance in a relationship, the
divergence of interests between the fiduciary and beneficiary, and the

137. Id. at 167-68 (footnotes omitted).
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specificity of duty, among others.13 s

Applying

this

analytical

framework

and

these

factors

to

four

areas-evaluation and grading, research relationships, patents and inventions, and
sexual harassment-where courts have attempted to determine whether teachers
or educational institutions are liable for breach of fiduciary duties to students, the
authors conclude that courts should find and have found breaches of a fiduciary
duty in several circumstances.13 9 A chart summarizing their analysis and
conclusions shows the following:
Educational Area

Magnitude of Duty

Magnitude of Breach

Breach of
Fiduciary Duty

Evaluation/Grading

Relatively Low

Relatively Low

No

Relationships

Relatively High

Relatively High

Yes

Patents and
Inventions

Relatively High

Relatively High

Yes

Sexual Harassment

High

High

Yes

Research

Given the nature ofthe four educational areas selected, it is not surprising that
the authors focused their analysis on decisions and issues in the higher education
setting. Indeed, of the four areas selected, only sexual harassment (and sexual
abuse) and, to a far lesser extent, grading and evaluation present themselves in the
K-12 setting. And, given the in loco parentis doctrine's current inapplicability
to higher education,'4 0 it is likewise not surprising that the authors did not discuss,
let alone analyze, the effect of that doctrine on the existence of teacher-student
fiduciary relations.

138. Id. at 168-69.
139. Id. at 161, 219-29.
140. See supra note 13 and cases and commentary discussed therein; see also Buttny v.
Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968) (noting "that the doctrine of'In Loco Parentis' is
no longer tenable in a university community"); Univ. of Md. E. Shore v. Rhaney, 858 A.2d 497,
499 n.2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) ("Most jurisdictions have rejected the proposition that a college
owes an in locoparentisobligation to its students." (citing Nero v. Kan. State Univ., 861 P.2d 768
(Kan. 1993))). Commentators have also almost uniformly proclaimed the in loco parentis
relationship defunct at the college and university level. See, e.g., WiLLIAM A. KAPLiN, THE LAW
OF HIGHER EDUCATION 5-7 (2d ed. 1985) (outlining factors leading to the demise of the in loco
parentisdoctrine in higher education); Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 282 (noting that in "the
college context ... in loco parentis . . . has undergone a clear rise and complete demise in

[American] courts").
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IV. WHY A PORTION OF THE CASE LAW HOLDS AND NEARLY ALL OF THE
SCHOLARSHIP/COMMENTARY OPINES THAT K-12 TEACHERS
ARE FIDUCIARIES TO STUDENTS

Several reasons can explain the split in the case law and the near-unanimity
in the commentary and scholarship concerning whether K- 12 teachers should owe
fiduciary duties to their students.
A. Analogistic and MoralisticReasoning and the Teacher'sProfessionalRole
First and foremost, the judicial and scholarly inclination to recognize K-12
teachers as fiduciaries to their students stems from the characterization of teachers
as fiduciaries when doctrinal analysis-including, in particular, doctrinal analysis
under the in loco parentis doctrine-might not lead to that result. More and more
frequently, teachers are identified as role models. 4 ' Indeed, depending on school
boards' (and judges' and juries') views concerning teacher conduct-both onand off-duty-and its nexus to a teacher's qualifications and fitness to teach, a
teacher's job may depend on whether his or her conduct satisfies role model
criteria. 142 And, the education community has rightly attempted to professionalize
teachers-by adopting and enforcing Codes of Professional Conduct14 3 and
continuing education requirements' 44 and by seeking increases in teacher salaries
and other forms of compensation. 145
B. Student Vulnerability and Needfor Protection
Students, of course, are on the other side of the equation. At the K- 12 level
and, particularly, in the primary and middle school grades, students constitute the
quintessential vulnerable population. Judges, commentators and society in
general rightly expect teachers to protect students from harm and exploitation to
the extent teachers have the power to do so. At the very least, teachers are
expected to not cause students harm, to not exploit students-physically or
emotionally-and to certainly avoid doing so in the sexually abusive and/or
sexually harassing manner that makes up the allegations in so many of the K- 12
teacher-student fiduciary duty cases discussed above.'4 6

141. See supra note I and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Walthart v. Bd. ofDirs. of Edgewood-Colesburg Cmty. Sch. Dist., 694 N.W.2d
740, 748 (Iowa 2005).
143.

See, e.g., IDAHO STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., CODE OF ETHICS FOR IDAHO PROFESSIONAL

EDUCATORS (2009), available at http://www.sde.idah.
144. See, e.g., Thomas B. Corcoran, HelpingTeachers Teach Well: TransformingProfessional
Development, CPRE POuCY BRIEFS (June 1995), availableat http://www2.ed.gov/pubs/CPRE/
t6l/index.html.
145. See, e.g., Take Action to Honor and Reward Teachers, AM. TEACHER, http://www.
theteachersalaryproject.org/outreach.php (last visited July 6, 2013).
146. Ofthe nearly twenty-five cases surveyed and discussed in Part III.A. ofthis Article, more
than half involved allegations of teacher-on-student sexual relations or harassment.
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C. The K-12 Teacher-StudentRelationship and the Uncertainty
Stemming from Analogy
The confluence of these three factors-increased professionalism
expectations placed upon teachers, the vulnerability of K-12 students, and the
morally-laden fact patterns of a substantial number of the reported decisions-has
led to analogistic, non-doctrinal reasoning on the part of judges. In turn, that
reasoning has led to the conclusion that primary and secondary school teachers
are fiduciaries to their student charges and/or deciding breach of fiduciary duty
claims against those same teachers. Thus, in Evans, both the trial judge and
appellate court, in re-sentencing and in reviewing the re-sentencing of a public
school teacher for drug trafficking, were able to justify a harsher sentence by
blithely stating that the teacher, under the in loco parentis doctrine, was a
fiduciary to the 47
public (not just the students) served by the high school where the
teacher taught. 1
Similarly, in Rocci, the teacher's own acknowledgment that her "role was one
as a fiduciary charged with the care of her students" in supervising students on
a field trip went well beyond the duties required of teachers under the in loco
parentis doctrine. 148 And, in the two cases where courts expressly used
analogistic thinking, they came to diametrically-opposite results. Thus, in
McMahon, a case involving an alleged sexual relationship between a boarding
school staff member and a student, the court, relying on the in loco parentis
doctrine and analogizing that "the relationship between a boarding school and its
minor student has the same dignity under the law as the relationship between a
bank and its customers and that between partners," held that the student had
stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the school.' 4 9
Conversely, in Key, where the mother of a special needs student brought suit
on behalf of herself and the student against a Catholic school, its administrators
and teachers who allegedly caused the student to withdraw from the school by
failing to meet the student's needs under the law, the appellate court, not relying
on or mentioning the in loco parentis doctrine, analogized the facts to prior case
law holding that priests do not owe a fiduciary duty to parishioners and affirmed
the lower court's holding
that the school and its personnel did not owe a fiduciary
150
student.
the
to
duty

147. State v. Evans, No. S-00-016, 2000 WL 1643515, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2000);
see also discussion supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.

148. Rocci v. Ecole Secondaire MacDonald-Cartier, 755 A.2d 583, 587 (N.J. 2000); see also
discussion supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
149. McMahon v. Randolph-Macon Acad., No. 97-11, 1997 WL 33616521, at *2 (Va. Cir.
Ct. June 16, 1997); see also discussion supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
150. Key v. Coryell, 185 S.W.3d 98, 101, 106 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004); see also discussion supra

notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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D. Return to Doctrine
As discussed more fully below, a return to doctrinal underpinningsspecifically, a return to a proper understanding and application of the in loco
parentis doctrine and law of fiduciary duty relevant to the K- 12 teacher-student
context-should enable courts to avoid (or, at the very least, augment) the
analogistic and moralistic reasoning that has led to a split in the case law.
Equally important, greater reliance on doctrinal thinking will better enable courts
to properly determine whether and when K-12 teachers have a fiduciary
relationship with students. That doctrinal-based proposal as to whether and/or
when K-12 schools and school personnel owe a fiduciary duty to students and a
discussion linking that proposal to well-settled principles of in loco parentis and
fiduciary law follows.' 5
V. THE PROPOSED STANDARD AND EXCEPTIONS
Applying well-settled principles from the in loco parentis doctrine and the
law creating and regulating fiduciary relationships, this Article proposes the
following standard regarding whether, and/or when; K-12 schools and school
personnel, including teachers and administrators, owe a fiduciary duty to
students:
(1) As a general rule, K-12 schools and school personnel should not be
held to owe a fiduciary duty to students. Specifically, no fiduciary
duty should exist when school personnel engage in conduct
undertaken as a legitimate part of the purpose for which they are
employed. Primary and secondary school administrators and
teachers are employed for the purpose of the student's education or
the education of the group of which the student is a member; and

151. To be sure, doctrinal or rules-based analysis and analogistic reasoning are fundamental
to legal analysis and are not mutually exclusive. See Wilson Huhn, The Stages ofLegal Reasoning:
Formalism,Analogy, and Realism, 48 ViLE. L. REv. 305, 305-06, 359-61 (2003). In this regard,
the decision to recognize or not recognize a fiduciary relationship between K-12 teachers and
students, guided by duty of care principles derived from the in loco parentis doctrine, requires
analogistic thinking in the sense that a decision-maker should and must evaluate the comparative
factual and legal circumstances informing that relationship when deciding whether to recognize a
fiduciary relationship in one set of circumstances, but not in another. Indeed, this Article's
conclusion that a fiduciary relationship should exist between a K- 12 teacher and a student when the
teacher engages in ultra vires acts relies on both a negative implication from the application of the
in loco parentis doctrine to circumstances where a teacher engages in conduct stemming from the
purposes for which he or she is employed and on analogizing to other fiduciary relationships. The
point, ultimately, is one of emphasis. Reliance on analogistic (and moralistic) thinking to the
exclusion or at the expense of in loco parentis (and fiduciary duty) doctrinal principles when
analyzing the question ofwhether K- 12 schools and school personnel owe students a fiduciary duty
would be shortsighted-particularly where the in loco parentis doctrine has had such a long
pedigree and analogistic reasoning has led to less-than-consistent judicial decision making.
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(2) K-12 schools and school personnel should only be held to owe a
fiduciary duty to students under two general circumstances: when
they either (a) engage in conduct, such as sexual harassment or
abuse, wholly outside the purpose of, but made possible by, that
educational relationship or (b) take on traditional fiduciary role such
as holding money in trust or otherwise administering funds for
students.
A. The GeneralRule: K-12 Schools and School PersonnelDo Not Owe a
FiduciaryDuty to Students When Administratorsand Teachers Engage in
Conductfor the Purposesfor Which They Were Hired,
i.e., the Educationof Students
1. The In Loco Parentis-DerivedStandardof Careis Lower than a Fiduciary
Duty.-As discussed previously, the in loco parentis doctrine generally enhances
the authority of K-12 schools and school personnel over students or, stated
conversely, limits the rights of individual students.152 Although the in loco
parentis doctrine has a student-protective aspect, the standard of care for
administrators and teachers under the doctrine favors school and school
personnel: as a matter of tort law, schools and school personnel will be liable to
students only when they act unreasonably, i.e., negligently, or, even more
forgiving, when they engage in willful and wanton conduct. 53 In contrast, as also
discussed previously, a fiduciary duty is a higher and more exacting standard of
care than the reasonableness standard under negligence principles.'5 4 Thus,
courts, such as in Franchiand Thomas, which have expressly or implicitly acted
consistent with the in loco parentis doctrine by refusing to impose a higher,
fiduciary duty on K-12 schools and school personnel vis-d-vis students,' have
acted in a doctrinally-sound manner. Conversely, courts, such as in Terwilliger
and McMahon, which have suggested or held that K-12 schools and school
personnel owe a fiduciary duty to students-either without reference to the in
loco parentis doctrine or, worse, in reliance on the doctrine 156 -have strayed from
or, in the latter instance, misapprehended fundamental principles of in loco
parentis.
2. Parentsand Guardians,i.e., the Source ofin Loco ParentisAuthority, Are
Not Generally Fiduciariesto Their Children.-Although not directly addressed
by the cases and scholarship discussed above, parents and guardians, i.e., the

152. See supranotes 15-20 and accompanying text.
153. See supranotes 25-29 and accompanying text.
154. See supratext accompanying note 59.
155. See Franchi v. New Hampton Sch., 656 F. Supp. 2d 252,264-65 (D.N.H. 2009); Thomas
v. Bd. of Educ., 759 F. Supp. 2d 477, 503-04 (D. Del. 2010); see also supra text accompanying
notes 67-69, 73-75.
156. See, e.g., Doe v. Terwilliger, No. CV095024692, 2010 WL 3327861, at *1-2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. July 29, 2010); McMahon v. Randolph-Macon Acad., No. 97-11, 1997 WL 33616521,
at *1-2 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 16, 1997); see also supra text accompanying notes 102-08, 114-16.
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individuals from whom K-12 schools and school personnel receive their
delegated in loco parentis authority, do not generally owe a fiduciary duty to their
children. 5 7 Thus, again, any suggestion that, as general matter, K-12 schools and
school personnel owe a fiduciary duty to students fails to take into account the
source of and limitations on the delegated authority exercised by schools and
school personnel under the in loco parentis doctrine.
3. The In Loco Parentis-DerivedStandard of Care, and Not a Higher
FiduciaryDuty, Is Applicable Where Teachers Engage in Conduct Undertaken
for the EducationalPurposesfor Which They Are Employed.-As pointed out
previously, the in loco parentis doctrine, by focusing on the fact that school
districts employ teachers for the purpose of educating students, contains within
it both the breadth of and limitations on its applicability in the K-12 teacherstudent context. 8 Specifically, courts have defined the duties arising from a
teacher's employment as follows:
The basic duties which arise from the teacher-student relationship are a
duty to supervise, a duty to exercise good judgment, and a duty to
instruct as to correct procedures, particularly, not but exclusively, when
potentially hazardous conditions or instrumentalities are present, and
these basic duties must co-exist with the whole purpose for the teacherstudent relationship, viz. education.'59
Thus, as long as school personnel engage in conduct undertaken as a
legitimate part of the educational purpose for which they are employed-and,
more particularly, engage in conduct consistent with their job duties of
supervising and instructing students-the duty of care standard derived from the
in loco parentis doctrine should apply. In turn, under in loco parentis, a
negligence (or willfulness) standard, rather than the more exacting fiduciary duty
standard, should govern the K-12 teacher-student relationship. As discussed
below, only when a teacher engages in conduct beyond the purposes for which
he or she is employed-in other words, engages in ultra vires16° acts such as
sexual harassment or sexual abuse--(or acts as a traditional fiduciary by holding
money or property in trust for a student) should the K- 12 teacher owe a fiduciary
obligation to students.' 6

157. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
159. Walsh v. Krantz, No. 1:07-CV-0616,2008 WL 3981492, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22,2008)
(citing Vicky M. v. Ne. Educ. Intermediate Unit 19, 486 F. Supp. 2d 437, 458 (M.D. Pa. 2007)),
afid, 386 Fed. Appx. 334 (3d Cir. 2010).
160. "Ultra vires" means literally "beyond the powers of' in Latin and has been defined as
"[u]nauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1559.
161. As discussed previously, this differentiation of roles is consistent with well-settled
principles of fiduciary law recognizing that an individual or entity may owe a fiduciary duty to
another person for one purpose, but not to the same person for another purpose. See supra text
accompanying note 56. More important, this distinction not only comports with the internal
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4. Recognition of a FiduciaryDuty May Conflict with the Duty of Undivided
Loyalty and Conflict of Interest Principles.-Recognition of a fiduciary
relationship between K- 12 schools and school personnel and their students would
run contrary to both the duty of undivided loyalty owed by fiduciaries to their
beneficiaries, partners and the like and the prohibition on conflicts of interest
which governs fiduciaries' conduct. 62 Teachers, in the course of performing their
teaching duties, have many "constituents" or "clients"-individual students, to
be sure, but also groups of students in the classroom and in the building in which
they work, parents, school administrators, and school boards. Indeed, one
commentator has explained why K-12 teachers should not have a fiduciary duty
to students as a matter of positive law (as opposed to ethical or moral
compunction) as follows:
The law's omission to subject teachers to fiduciary duties can be
explained in part by institutional considerations. Most teachers are civil
servants, subject to supervision by school administrators, school boards,
and other elected officials. Teachers are also, to some extent, subject to
supervision by parents. Perhaps these supplementary sources of direction
and control are sufficient to remedy the incapacity and lack of experience
of the students.'6 3
The above-quoted language suggests that courts should not hold teachers to
be fiduciaries because student vulnerability can be compensated for by other
educational stakeholders. However, at least one court has looked at some of those
institutional considerations and reached the same conclusion by alluding to the
divided loyalties and/or conflicts of interest they may cause:
The facts do not show that "that [the school] undertook to act primarily
for the benefit of [the student]." To the contrary, the Head of School's
Welcome Letter in the Student Handbook sets a tone that suggests that
the paramount interest of all members of the Porter's community should
be Porter's,and not the students. Windsor's letter states that "[w]hat
makes our community successful is the personal dedication of each
individual to fulfilling her own dreams and desires and to working

limitations set forth in the in loco parentis doctrine itself, but is also consistent with the broader in
loco parentis doctrine's focus on the situs of teacher-student interaction and possible student injury.
In this regard, a teacher will invariably engage in conduct consistent with the education purposes
for which he or she was hired either on school grounds or on an authorized school activity, such
as a field trip or extracurricular athletic or academic event, away from school grounds. Under these
circumstances, in loco parentis-derived liability for tortious conduct would be under a negligence
(or willful and wanton) standard, not the higher duty of care owed by a fiduciary. Conversely, a
teacher is more likely to engage in ultra vires conduct-such as engaging in sexual relations with
a student-away from school grounds. Under these latter circumstances, in loco parentis has no
application and the higher, fiduciary duty standard of care should apply.
162. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
163. FitzGibbon, supra note 132, at 268.
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wholeheartedlyfor the good of Porter's."164
In this day and age, with increasingly larger class sizes and inclusionary
models for teaching students of all abilities in the same classroom, it is hard to
imagine a teacher, while engaging in conduct designed to fulfill the educational
purposes for which he or she is employed, fulfilling a duty of loyalty to every
individual student. Indeed, in contrast to the classroom teaching scenario, the
paradigmatic examples of fiduciary relationships, such as the attorney-client or
trustee-beneficiary relationships, typically involve one-on-one relationships or
relationships where only a small number of individuals are entitled to the benefits
and protections of the relationship. Certainly, there are many instances where
teachers, performing their job duties, have no conflict of interest as between and
amongst students and other constituencies, including the school itself. Delivering
instruction to groups of regular education students and supervising students on
school grounds should, generally speaking, not raise any such issues. However,
attempting to deliver instruction to, and provide appropriate supervision and
discipline of, both regular education and special education students in the same
classroom setting inherently tests the limits of a teacher's ability to fulfill a duty
of loyalty to any one student. In so doing, the teacher must struggle with teaching
and regulating the conduct of students with wildly differing intellectual, not to
mention emotional, physical, and social abilities.
5. Recognition of a FiduciaryDuty Is Not Necessary to Fill a Remedial
Gap.-Lastly, a refusal to recognize liability for breach of fiduciary duty when
K- 12 teachers engage in conduct designed to fulfill the educational purposes for
which they are employed would not meaningfully reduce or limit the remedies to
which a student would be entitled. Remedies for breach of fiduciary duty often
replicate the damages for breach of contract,165 which typically are insignificant
in the public school setting because of the lack of consideration changing hands
between students or their parents/guardians and schools, and would also include
tort remedies. 66 As discussed above, however, state law tort remedies are
available to students, either individually or through their parents or guardians,
when schools and school personnel fail to satisfy their duty to supervise students
or when they otherwise act negligently or willfully and wantonly. 67 Likewise,
federal civil rights remedies are available to students when schools or school
personnel violate their rights under Section 1983.168 And, federal remedies under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Individuals with Disabilities in

164. Bass ex reL Bass v. Miss Porter's School, 738 F. Supp. 2d 307, 331 (D. Conn. 2010)
(third alteration in original) (citation omitted).
165. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Carl J. Meil, Jr., Inc., No. WDQ-10-2720, 2011 WL
1743177, at *6 (D. Md. May 5, 2011); Fin. Servs. Vehicle Trust v. Saad, 900 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354
(N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
166. Gen. Bus. Machs. v. Nat'l Semiconductor Datachecker/DTS, 664 F. Supp. 1422, 1425
(D. Utah 1987); Multimedia Techs., Inc. v. Wilding, 586 S.E.2d 74, 78 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
167. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., C.B. v. Sonora Sch. Dist., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1052 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
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Education Act will be available to special education students when schools fail
to comply with the mandates of special education law.'69 Thus, the ability to
recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty when teachers do not fulfill the
purposes for which they are employed adds 1little
to the remedies otherwise
70
available to students under those circumstances.
B. Exceptions to the GeneralRule: K-12 Schools and School Personnel
Should Owe a FiduciaryDuty to Students When Administrators and Teachers
Engage in Conduct Made Possible by, but Beyond, the EducationalPurposes
for Which They Are Employed or When They Act as TraditionalFiduciaries
1. K-12 SchoolPersonnelShould Owe a FiduciaryDuty to Studentsfor Ultra
Vires Acts Resulting from their Educational Relationship.-This Article's
determination that the in loco parentis doctrine and relevant principles of
fiduciary duty compel the conclusion that K-12 schools and school personnel do
not owe a fiduciary duty to students when administrators and teachers engage in
conduct undertaken as a legitimate part of the educational purposes for which
they are employed does not necessarily mean that a fiduciary duty exists when
administrators and teachers engage in ultra vires acts. At most, that
determination suggests by negative implication that either the converse is true or
that it would be consistent with the in loco parentis doctrine to hold K-12 school
personnel to a higher, fiduciary duty standard when they engage in conduct with
students that was made possible by, but was beyond, the legitimate educational
purposes for which they were hired. The key, then, is to evaluate the nature of
the K- 12 teacher-student relationship to determine whether there are additional
factors-both doctrinal and analogistic-that support the imposition of a
fiduciary duty on teachers for their ultra vires acts. As discussed below, both by
negative implication from application of in loco parentis principles to
circumstances where teachers engage in conduct in furtherance of legitimate
educational purposes and assessment of the K- 12 teacher-student relationship lead

169. E.S. v. Konocti Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:10-cv-02245-NJV, 2010 WL4780257, at *6
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 16,2010); Breanne C. v. S. York Cnty. Sch. Dist., 732 F. Supp. 2d 474,483 (M.D.
Pa. 2010).

170. Courts have almost universally refused to recognize tort claims for educational
malpractice brought by or on behalf of students against educational institutions, including K-12
schools, seeking to challenge the quality or sufficiency of the services provided by school
employees, the course of instruction, and overall education provided. See, e.g., Waugh v. Morgan
Stanley & Co., 966 N.W.2d 540, 549-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (collecting cases). Because claims for
educational malpractice are not available to students and/or their parents or guardians, courts have
rejected educational malpractice claims when they have been recast as breach of fiduciary duty
claims. See, e.g., Houston v. Mile High Adventist Acad., 846 F. Supp. 1449, 1456, 1459 (D. Colo.
1994); Ogindo v. DeFleur, No. 07-CV-1322, 2008 WL 5105153, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2008)

("New York's policy of precluding educational malpractice claims may not be circumvented by
couching the claim in terms of some other cause of action." (citing Alligood v. Cnty. of Erie, 749
N.Y.S.2d 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002))).
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to the conclusion that teachers are fiduciaries to students when their education
relationship leads to ultra vires conduct. 7'
a. Recognition of a fiduciary duty for ultra vires conduct is consistent (or,
at least, not inconsistent) with application of the in loco parentis doctrine.-As
discussed above, the in loco parentis doctrine is self-limiting: by its terms, it
applies only when K-12 school personnel engage in conduct designed to fulfill
the educational purposes for which they are employed.7 2 Thus, in loco
parentis-and more important, its limitations on the tort liability of school
personnel to negligent or even wanton and willful conduct directed toward
students-has no application where teachers engage in conduct wholly
inconsistent with their educational mission. Teacher conduct involving sexual
abuse or harassment directed toward students clearly falls into this ultra vires
category. Indeed, such conduct violates ethical canons of the teaching
profession, 173 and can lead to discharge from employment,174 civil liability, 175 or
criminal sanctions.176 For these reasons, nothing in the in loco parentis doctrine
itself limits the extension of fiduciary obligations to the K-12 teacher-student
relationship when teachers engage in ultra vires conduct affecting students.
b. The relationship of trust and confidence created by the K-12 teacherstudent educationalrelationship,as well as the teacher'ssuperior authorityand
the student's vulnerabilityin that relationship,mandaterecognitionofafiduciary
duty for ultra vires teacherconduct.-As discussed previously, where a person
in a position of authority in a relationship of trust and confidence exploits that
position and relationship by engaging in sexual relations with the more vulnerable
person in the relationship, courts will invariably find a breach of fiduciary duty.

171. The doctrine of negative implication is a canon of construction whereby a court
determines the meaning of a statute or legal doctrine by analyzing items or circumstances
specifically addressed therein and then determines that items or circumstances omitted, or not
specifically addressed by the statute or doctrine, are not covered by that provision. See, e.g., United
States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002). The negative implication doctrine is only a guide, is not
an infallible indicator of meaning, and can be overcome by contrary indications of intent or
coverage. Id.; see also John F. Manning, The New Purposivism,2011 SuP. CT. REv. 113, 179. The
doctrine, however, has been utilized by the United States Supreme Court on numerous occasions
to determine the meaning of federal statutes and constitutional provisions, most notably in the
Court's Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITrrTIONAL LAW 174-77 (16th ed. 2007).
172. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., IDAHO STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 143, Principle II, at 9.
174. See, e.g., Bethel Park Sch. Dist. v. Bethel Park Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1607, 55 A.3d
154, 158-60 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012); Crosby v. Holt, 320 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
175. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,277 (1998); Kinman v. Omaha Pub.
Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1999); Chancellor v. Pottsgrove Sch. Dist., 501 F. Supp. 2d
695, 709-10, 714 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
176. See, e.g., State v. Berrio, 690 S.E.2d 559 (Table), No. COA09-608, 2010 WL 157566,
at *2 (N.C. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2010).
177. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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An obvious disparity of power exists between K-12 teachers and their students
because of the nature of their relationship. Based on that relationship, trust
typically emanates from the student to the teacher. And, the existent vulnerability
of those same students increases when they are alone with teachers and/or are
outside of the classroom setting. For these reasons, the K-12 teacher-student
relationship provides an ideal setting for those few opportunistic teachers and
administrators who wish to exploit their students. To quote Justice Stevens from
his dissent in Gebser, a teacher's ultra vires conduct is "made possible ...

by

reason 78of the authority that his employer, the school district, had delegated to
1
him.

Moreover, ultra vires conduct by teachers involving exploitative sexual
conduct with students falls far more squarely within the classic definition of a
breach of fiduciary duty than a teacher who might have shortcomings in the
classroom instructional setting. Indeed, as alluded to above, the one-on-one
context that typically characterizes teacher-student liaisons is consistent with the
more common examples of fiduciary relationships. And, given the opprobrium
appropriately directed toward such conduct, sexual abuse and harassment of
students by K-12 teachers is the one area where the moralistic tendency ofjudges
and commentators to create and regulate what they deem to be a fiduciary
relationship is particularly well taken.
For these reasons, K-12 teachers and administrators should be held to be
fiduciaries to students when engaging in conduct facilitated by, but beyond, the
educational purposes for which they are employed.
2. K-12 School PersonnelShould Owe a FiduciaryDuty to Students When
They Perform TraditionalFiduciaryRoles Resulting From Their Educational
Relationship.-As discussed previously, even parents, who typically do not have
a fiduciary relationship with their children, will owe a fiduciary duty to their
children when they (the parents) go beyond their usual parental role and serve as
trustees of funds for their children or fail to pay child support.'79 Likewise,
teachers who go beyond their role and purpose as a teacher and hold funds for
students should have a fiduciary duty to students as to that aspect of their
relationship. For example, in In re the Arbitration Between Howell Public
Schools and Howell Education Association, where a teacher took financial
advantage of students by receiving a kickback in the form of per student
commissions and a chaperone fee from a travel company on an out-of-town field
trip on which she acted both as a teacher and tour director, the arbitrator correctly
ruled that the teacher had breached a fiduciary duty that she owed to the
students.'
Thus, as a second exception to the general rule, K-12 teachers who

178. 524 U.S. at 299 (Stevens, J.,
joined by Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting),
discussed supra at notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
180. See discussion supra at notes 109-10 and accompanying text. In Howell Public Schools,
the arbitrator held that the teacher's fiduciary duty stemmed from the in loco parentis
responsibilities that the teacher owed to the students. 1991 WL 692932 (Arb.) (1991) (Brown,
Arb.). However, under the analytical approach discussed above, a teacher's duty under the in loco

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:71 1

act as traditional fiduciaries (beyond their teaching role) should likewise be held
to owe a fiduciary obligation to their students. 181
3. Recognition of a FiduciaryDuty under these Circumstances Will Fill a
Remedial Gap.-In contrast to the lack of any significant remedial utility for
recognizing breach of fiduciary duty claims when teachers fail to fulfill the
educational purposes for which they are employed, recognition of a breach of
fiduciary duty claim when teachers act in an ultra vires manner or as a traditional
fiduciary may add to the remedies available to students and their parents.
Certainly, as to ultra vires acts, including sexual relations with minor
students, students and their parents or guardians may recover tort remedies under
various theories, including battery and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.182 However, recognition of a breach of fiduciary duty claim in cases
involving sexual assault or sexual harassment would enhance the remedies
available to student victims-primarily because the legal standards governing
existing claims for sexual abuse or harassment against public entities, including
schools, under common law respondeat superior, constitutional, and federal
statutory theories, such as Title IX, impose significant barriers to recovery. 83
Likewise, as to conduct by teachers involving the performance of traditional
fiduciary duties-such as the administration of funds-recognition of breach of
fiduciary claims will make tort remedies available, including non-economic
84
damages and, in cases of outrageous or despicable conduct, punitive damages. 1

parentis doctrine does not translate to a higher, i.e., fiduciary, duty of care when the teacher is
engaged in conduct undertaken for the educational purposes for which he or she is employed.
Rather, a fiduciary duty will only arise where in loco parentis has no application, i.e., where a
teacher engages in conduct beyond the educational purpose for which he or she is employed or acts
as a traditional fiduciary long-recognized outside the K- 12 educational context. In Howell Public
Schools, the teacher's conduct arguably fell into both categories, although her relationship with her
students looked to be more that of a traditional fiduciary than an ultra vires actor. Id. In either
event, considerations unrelated to the in loco parentis doctrine should have driven the arbitrator's
decision that the teacher owed a fiduciary obligation to her students.
181. Recognition of a fiduciary duty when a teacher engages in ultravires conduct or acts as
a traditional fiduciary is consistent with longstanding principles of fiduciary duty holding that good
faith is not a defense to a breach of fiduciary duty claim. See discussion supra at notes 62-64 and
accompanying text. As to ultra vires acts-particularly where a teacher's conduct involves sexual
abuse or harassment of a student-given the deplorable nature of such conduct, the possibility that
the teacher acted in good faith will be remote, if not nonexistent. Likewise, where a teacher acts
as a traditional fiduciary, but mishandles student funds or property, the expertise required of the
teacher under those circumstances mandates more than an empty head and a good heart. Thus,
under either of the two exceptions to the general rule, a teacher's purported or actual good faith
should not be a defense.
182. See, e.g., Doe v. Fournier, 851 F. Supp. 2d 207, 225-27 (D. Mass. 2012).
183. Demitchell, supra note 34, at 20, 28-51.
184. Dury v. Ireland, Stapleton, Pryor & Pascoe, P.C., No. 08-cv-01285-LTB-MEH, 2009 WL
2139856, at *6 (D. Colo. 2009) (recognizing the availability of non-economic damages); Gen. Bus.
Machs. v. Nat'l Semiconductor Datachecker/DTS, 664 F. Supp. 1422, 1426 (D. Utah 1987)
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By so doing, courts will enhance a student's remedies beyond the compensatory
and economic damages typically available for breach of contract.185
CONCLUSION

Under the in loco parentis doctrine and well-settled principles underlying the
creation and regulation of fiduciary relationships, K-12 schools and school
personnel should not be considered fiduciaries to their students when they render
the educational services called for by their employment. Rather, they should only
have a fiduciary duty to their students when they engage in conduct completely
beyond, but made possible by, their educational mission--or when they act as
traditional fiduciaries. By focusing on the doctrinal principles underlying in loco
parentis and fiduciary duty, courts and commentators, although appropriately
insisting on high standards of behavior for administrators and teachers vis-A-vis
students, will avoid or augment the moralistic and analogistic thinking that has
caused some authorities to expand fiduciary relationships in the K-12 setting
beyond their doctrinal roots and likewise fail to recognize a fiduciary relationship,
and the breach thereof, where it would be appropriate to do so. In so doing,
courts and commentators will more accurately and appropriately define and
regulate student-teacher relationships in the K- 12 setting.

(requiring a showing of willful, malicious, or reckless indifference for the award of punitive
damages). At least one jurisdiction has legislatively prohibited recovery of punitive damages
against public entities for tort claims. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-918 (2013) ("Governmental
entities and their employees shall not be liable for punitive damages on any claim allowed under
the provisions of this act.").
185. See, e.g., In re Montagne, 425 B. R. 111, 123 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2009) (finding "noneconomic damages [for] emotional distress, anxiety," and the like generally are not recoverable on
a claim for breach of contract).

